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A NEW THEORY FOR CORPORATE LAW AND
GOVERNANCE
Zohar Goshen*& Richard Squire**
The problem of managerial agency costs dominates debates in cor-
porate law. Many leading scholars advocate reforms that would reduce
agency costs by forcing ﬁrms to allocate more control to shareholders.
Such proposals disregard the costs that shareholders avoid by delegating
control to managers and voluntarily restricting their own control rights.
This Essay introduces principal-cost theory, which posits that each
ﬁrm’s optimal governance structure minimizes the sum of principal
costs, produced when investors exercise control, and agent costs, pro-
duced when managers exercise control. Both principal costs and agent
costs can arise from honest mistakes (which generate competence
costs) and from disloyal conduct (which generate conﬂict costs).
Because the expected costs of competence and conﬂict are ﬁrm-speciﬁc,
the optimal division of control is ﬁrm-speciﬁc as well. Thus, ﬁrms
rationally select from a range of governance structures that empower
shareholders to varying degrees. The empirical predictions produced by
principal-cost theory are more accurate than those produced by any
theory focused solely on agency costs. Principal-cost theory also suggests
different policy prescriptions. Rather than banning some governance
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features and mandating others, lawmakers should permit each ﬁrm to
tailor its governance structure based on its ﬁrm-speciﬁc tradeoff between
principal costs and agent costs.
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INTRODUCTION
For the last forty years, the problem of agency costs has dominated
the study of corporate law and governance.1 Agency costs result from the
separation of control and ownership that occurs when managers run a
ﬁrm but must share its proﬁts with equityholders.2 Such managers face
incentives to expend less effort and consume more perquisites than they
would if they were the ﬁrm’s sole owners.3 By shirking their duties and
diverting value, managers generate agency costs, which reduce their
ﬁrm’s value.4 Many scholars—we refer to them as agency-cost essentialists—
treat the reduction of agency costs as the essential function of corporate
law and of related ﬁelds such as securities regulation. To reduce agency
costs, the essentialists would mandate corporate-governance arrangements,
such as proxy access, that allocate more control rights to shareholders.5
And they would ban arrangements that disempower shareholders, such
as staggered boards6 and dual-class shares.7 To the essentialists, the reduc-
tion of agency costs is an unalloyed good toward which all aspects of
corporate law and governance should be directed.8
Drawing upon a seminal paper by Professors Michael Jensen and
William Meckling,9 agency-cost essentialists assume that ﬁrms delegate
control to managers, thereby separating control from ownership, solely
1. For the seminal work on agency costs in business ﬁrms, see Michael C. Jensen &
William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership
Structure, 3 J. Fin. Econ. 305 (1976).
2. Id. at 309.
3. Id. at 312–13.
4. Id. at 313.
5. See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk & Scott Hirst, Private Ordering and the Proxy Access
Debate, 65 Bus. Law. 329, 335–36 (2010) (advocating a proxy access default rule).
6. See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk, John C. Coates IV & Guhan Subramanian, The
Powerful Antitakeover Force of Staggered Boards: Theory, Evidence, and Policy, 54 Stan.
L. Rev. 887, 919 (2002) [hereinafter Bebchuk et al., Force of Staggered Boards] (noting
that an effective staggered board “should provide incumbents virtually complete protec-
tion from hostile bids, with all of the potential drawbacks in terms of managerial agency
costs that are associated with such insulation”).
7. See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Reinier Kraakman & George G. Triantis, Stock
Pyramids, Cross-Ownership, and Dual Class Equity: The Mechanisms and Agency Costs of
Separating Control from Cash-Flow Rights, in Concentrated Corporate Ownership 295,
310–11 (Randall K. Morck ed., 2000) [hereinafter Bebchuk et al., Stock Pyramids] (ﬁn-
ding high agency costs in ﬁrms with controlling shareholders, including those with dual-
class shares).
8. See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118
Harv. L. Rev. 833 (2005) [hereinafter Bebchuk, Shareholder Power].
9. See Jensen & Meckling, supra note 1.
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to facilitate the aggregation of capital from multiple investors.10 Yet many
wholly owned ﬁrms also delegate control to managers, thereby incurring
agency costs that, under agency-cost essentialism, serve no positive func-
tion.11 The essentialists also have difficulty explaining why corporations
often choose to go public with staggered boards, whose members are sub-
ject to discretionary removal by shareholders only once every three years
rather than annually,12 or with a dual-class share structure, which denies
outside shareholders the right to replace directors at all.13 If capital
aggregation were the sole beneﬁt of delegating control to managers,
ﬁrms that tied investors’ hands in such ways would consistently generate
lower ﬁnancial returns than those that give more power to shareholders.
Yet careful empirical studies ﬁnd no consistent relationship between the
degree of shareholder empowerment and overall financial performance.14
Such studies conﬁrm the intuition that investors also generate costs when
they exercise control and that firms must weigh those costs against agency
costs when selecting a governance structure. By ignoring that tradeoff,
agency-cost essentialism produces inaccurate empirical predictions and
unwise policy prescriptions.
To correct the shortcomings of agency-cost essentialism, we offer a
theory of corporate governance that we term principal-cost theory. The
theory states that each ﬁrm’s optimal governance structure minimizes
total control costs, which are the sum of principal costs and agent costs.15 Prin-
cipal costs occur when investors exercise control, and agent costs occur
when managers exercise control. Both types of cost can be subdivided
into competence costs, which arise from honest mistakes attributable to a
lack of expertise, information, or talent, and conflict costs, which arise from
the skewed incentives produced by the separation of ownership and con-
trol. When investors exercise control, they make mistakes due to a lack of
expertise, information, or talent, thereby generating principal compe-
tence costs. To avoid such costs, they delegate control to managers whom
they expect will run the ﬁrm more competently. But delegation separates
10. Aggregating capital from multiple investors enables a ﬁrm to achieve economies
of scale, and it enables investors to diversify risk. Jensen & Meckling, supra note 1, at 313 &
n.15. Economies of scale are efficiencies that a ﬁrm achieves by increasing output; they
typically manifest in a decline in average cost per unit of production as the number of
units produced rises. Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 413 (8th ed. 2011).
11. Daniel Ames, The Relation Between Private Ownership of Equity and Executive
Compensation, 13 J. Bus. Inquiry 81, 84 (2014) (detailing the practice whereby wholly
owned corporations employ professional managers).
12. See, e.g., Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 141(d) (2016) (allowing corporations to adopt
staggered boards in their certiﬁcates of incorporation).
13. See Zohar Goshen & Assaf Hamdani, Corporate Control and Idiosyncratic Vision,
125 Yale L.J. 560, 590–91 (2016).
14. For a description of the studies, see infra section IV.A.
15. For the full analysis of these concepts, see infra Part II.
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ownership from control, leading to agent conflict costs, and also to prin-
cipal conﬂict costs to the extent that principals retain the power to hold
managers accountable. Finally, managers themselves can make honest
mistakes, generating agent competence costs.
Principal costs and agent costs are substitutes for each other: Any
reallocation of control rights between investors and managers decreases
one type of cost but increases the other.16 The rate of substitution is ﬁrm-
speciﬁc, based on factors such as the ﬁrm’s business strategy, its industry,
and the personal characteristics of its investors and managers. Therefore,
each ﬁrm has a distinct division of control rights that minimizes total
control costs. Because the cost-minimizing division varies by ﬁrm, the
optimal governance structure does as well. The implication is that law’s
proper role is to allow ﬁrms to select from a wide range of governance
structures, rather than to mandate some structures and ban others.
Agency-cost essentialists focus on one of the four categories of con-
trol costs we have identiﬁed: agent conﬂict costs.17 They downplay agent
competence costs and, more importantly, disregard both types of princi-
pal costs.18 Yet principal costs are more fundamental than agent costs, as
the goal of reducing them is the reason that investors delegate control to
managers, generating the conﬂict costs that preoccupy agency-cost essen-
tialists. We term our thesis in this Essay principal-cost theory because
principal costs are the logical starting point in analyzing problems of ﬁrm
governance, including the question of why ﬁrms adopt such a wide
variety of governance structures.
A ﬁrm that seeks to maximize total returns will weigh principal costs
against agent costs when deciding how to divide control between ma-
nagers and investors. When a ﬁrm has multiple investors, principal costs
arise primarily from conﬂicting interests (which generate principal con-
flict costs) and the duplicative efforts and coordination problems entailed
by joint decisionmaking (which generate principal competence costs).19
But even if a ﬁrm has just one investor, principal costs—in particular,
principal competence costs—will arise whenever the investor makes honest
16. See infra section III.A.
17. See, e.g., John Armour, Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, What Is
Corporate Law?, in The Anatomy of Corporate Law 1, 2 (Reinier Kraakman et al. eds., 2d
ed. 2009) (“[M]uch of corporate law can usefully be understood as responding to three
principal sources of opportunism: conﬂicts between managers and shareholders, conﬂicts
among shareholders, and conﬂicts between shareholders and the corporation’s other
constituencies . . . .”).
18. For an example, see infra section I.B (discussing the second limiting assumption
of Jensen and Meckling).
19. See Henry Hansmann, Ownership of the Firm, 4 J.L. Econ. & Org. 267, 277–80
(1988) (analyzing costs of collective decisionmaking).
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mistakes due to a lack of expertise, information, or talent.20 Indeed, the
goal of reducing principal competence costs explains why even wholly
owned ﬁrms often delegate control to managers.
The ﬁrm-speciﬁc nature of the tradeoff between principal costs and
agent costs is the reason that ﬁrms adopt a wide variety of governance
structures, each of which offers a different division of control between
investors and managers. At one end of the spectrum is the dual-class
share structure, which gives controlling owner-managers complete and
incontestable control.21 Firms that adopt a dual-class share structure
minimize potential principal costs but run the risk of high agent costs. At
the opposite end of the spectrum—rarely seen except in sole proprietor-
ships and small partnerships—are ﬁrms whose equity investors retain full
control over the selection and development of business strategy.22 Such
ﬁrms minimize potential agent costs but run the risk of high principal
costs. Toward the middle of the spectrum is the most common governance
structure in American public corporations: dispersed share ownership.23
Managers of ﬁrms with that structure exercise a large degree of control,
which can generate signiﬁcant agent costs. But shareholders can contest
control through a hostile tender offer or activism, the prospect of which
keeps agent costs in check.24 Because, however, hostile raiders and activist
hedge funds sometimes mistakenly target ﬁrms whose managers are in
fact effective,25 this ownership structure can also generate signiﬁcant
principal costs.
To be sure, we are not the ﬁrst commentators to observe that share-
holders (as opposed to managers) generate costs when exercising control.
Previous scholarship had identiﬁed particular sources of what we call
principal costs, such as short-termism, shareholder conﬂicts of interest,
20. See infra section II.A.1.
21. See infra section III.D.1.
22. See infra section III.D.2.
23. The concentrated-ownership structure is usually contrasted with the dispersed-
ownership structure, the prevailing structure among public ﬁrms in the United States and
the United Kingdom. See Ronald C. Anderson & David M. Reeb, Founding-Family
Ownership and Firm Performance: Evidence from the S&P 500, 58 J. Fin. 1301, 1302
(2003) (stating that roughly 35% of S&P 500 companies have families as controlling share-
holders); Marco Becht & J. Bradford DeLong, Why Has There Been So Little Block
Holding in America?, in A History of Corporate Governance Around the World: Family
Business Groups to Professional Managers 613, 613–14 (Randall K. Morck ed., 2007)
(contrasting the prevalence of dispersed-share ownership in the United States with block-
share ownership in other countries). But see Clifford G. Holderness, The Myth of Diffuse
Ownership in the United States, 22 Rev. Fin. Stud. 1377, 1378, 1382 tbl.1 (2009)
(presenting evidence casting doubt on the prevailing view that the ownership of most
American public ﬁrms is widely dispersed).
24. See infra notes 206–212 and accompanying text.
25. See infra note 213 and accompanying text.
2017] PRINCIPAL COSTS 773
and collective-action problems.26 Other commentators have not, however,
identiﬁed the complete set of principal costs that we describe here (in-
cluding both competence costs and conﬂict costs), nor have they concep-
tualized principal costs as a general category that is logically prior to
agent costs.27 We also are the ﬁrst commentators to describe how the
unavoidable tradeoff between principal costs and agent costs determines
each ﬁrm’s optimal governance structure.28
These contributions make salient two aspects of the corporate-
governance problem that scholars who ﬁxate on agency costs neglect.
First, a ﬁrm will suffer control costs regardless of who exercises control—
investors or managers. Second, because the impact of a given governance
structure on control costs is ﬁrm-speciﬁc, there is no particular gover-
nance structure that can be described as intrinsically good, bad, welfare
enhancing, or inefficient.
One test of a theory is the accuracy of its predictions. Principal-cost
theory makes different predictions than agency-cost essentialism about
the relationship between firm value and particular governance structures.
Essentialism suggests that ﬁrms that adopt shareholder-disempowering
governance features, such as staggered boards and dual-class shares, will
consistently underperform those that do not.29 Principal-cost theory, by
contrast, states that shareholder-disempowering governance features will
be efficient for some ﬁrms but not others, based on ﬁrm-speciﬁc charac-
teristics. Therefore, an empirical study that properly controls for such
characteristics and considers a sufficiently long period of time will ﬁnd
26. See Leo E. Strine Jr., Toward Common Sense and Common Ground? Reﬂections
on the Shared Interests of Managers and Labor in a More Rational System of Corporate
Governance, 33 J. Corp. L. 1, 6 (2007) (“As much as corporate law scholars fetishize the
agency costs that flow from the separation of ownership and control in operating compa-
nies, they have been amazingly quiet about the ‘separation of ownership from ownership.’”);
see also Bernard S. Black, Agents Watching Agents: The Promise of Institutional Investor
Voice, 39 UCLA L. Rev. 811, 821–22, 826–27 (1992) (discussing collective-action problems
and the conﬂicts of interest of institutional investors); Lynne L. Dallas, Short-Termism, the
Financial Crisis, and Corporate Governance, 37 J. Corp. L. 265, 267–73 (2012) (analyzing
the short-termism problem); Jeffrey N. Gordon, Shareholder Initiative: A Social Choice
and Game Theoretic Approach to Corporate Law, 60 U. Cin. L. Rev. 347, 359–63 (1991)
(describing shareholder “cycling” and its potential destructive effects); Edward B. Rock,
Controlling the Dark Side of Relational Investing, 15 Cardozo L. Rev. 987, 1000–04, 1003
n.72 (1994) (describing the conﬂict of interests between relational investors, shareholders,
and managers); Roberta Romano, Public Pension Fund Activism in Corporate Governance
Reconsidered, 93 Colum. L. Rev. 795, 799–839 (1993) (discussing the conflicts of public
pension funds); infra notes 112–119 and accompanying text (detailing previous scholar-
ship on the principal-cost theory).
27. Cf. infra section II.A.
28. See infra sections III.C–.D.
29. See infra notes 214–216 and accompanying text.
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no correlation between particular structural features and ﬁrm value.30 As
we show in this Essay, principal-cost theory does in fact explain the results
of most empirical studies better than agency-cost essentialism does.31
A second test of a theory is the wisdom of its policy prescriptions.
Agency-cost essentialists advocate shifting more control to shareholders,32
while a smaller group of scholars—sometimes referred to as the director-
supremacy school33—seeks to insulate corporate managers from control
contests.34 Principal-cost theory suggests that both policy prescriptions
are unwise, as both would treat all ﬁrms the same.35 Because the gover-
nance structure that minimizes control costs varies by ﬁrm, lawmakers—
including courts, regulators, and legislators—should avoid one-size-ﬁts-all
solutions. Rather, in the absence of clear market failures, lawmakers should
presume the efficiency of each ﬁrm’s chosen governance structure. And
they should seek to grow rather than shrink the menu of governance-
structure options.
Part I of this Essay describes agency-cost essentialism and identiﬁes
its shortcomings, especially its inability to explain common features of
the governance structures that business ﬁrms adopt. Part II introduces
and deﬁnes the two types of control costs: competence costs and conﬂict
costs. Part III presents principal-cost theory and shows why it explains
what agency-cost essentialism cannot. Part III also describes how the
governance structures that ﬁrms select can be arranged along a spectrum
that depicts each structure’s distinct tradeoff between principal costs and
agent costs. Finally, Part IV describes how principal-cost theory generates
30. Several economists have critiqued the empirical work by claiming that corporate
governance is endogenous and therefore that cross-sectional variation in governance struc-
ture should not correlate with performance. See, e.g., Harold Demsetz & Kenneth Lehn,
The Structure of Corporate Ownership: Causes and Consequences, 93 J. Pol. Econ. 1155,
1173–74 (1985). Principal-cost theory explains why corporate governance is endogenous.
31. See infra section IV.A.
32. See, e.g., Bebchuk, Shareholder Power, supra note 8, at 865–70 (discussing the
beneﬁts of increasing shareholder power and advocating a regime permitting share-
holders to “set the rules”).
33. See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy and Shareholder
Disempowerment, 119 Harv. L. Rev. 1735, 1744–51 (2006) [hereinafter Bainbridge,
Shareholder Disempowerment] (arguing that preservation of managerial discretion
should remain the default rule).
34. See, e.g., id. at 1747–49 (surveying corporate law rules that protect managers and
arguing that shareholder voting rights should do the same); Martin Lipton & Steven A.
Rosenblum, A New System of Governance: The Quinquennial Election of Directors, 58 U.
Chi. L. Rev. 187, 205–13 (1991) (arguing that the divergent interests of stockholders and
corporations necessitate that management be allowed to defend against hostile takeovers).
Implicitly, members of the director-supremacy school believe that principal costs are a
relatively large problem, although they do not identify the full set of principal costs we
describe, nor do they conceptualize principal costs as trading off against agent costs in the
choice of a ﬁrm’s governance structure.
35. See infra notes 37–39 and accompanying text.
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empirical predictions and policy prescriptions superior to those pro-
duced by agency-cost essentialism.
I. THE LIMITS OF AGENCY COSTS
The subject of most corporate law scholarship is the conﬂict of
interests between managers (broadly deﬁned to include directors) and
shareholders.36 Scholars almost invariably conceptualize this conﬂict in
terms of agency costs: the economic losses resulting from managers’
natural incentive to advance their personal interests even when those
interests conﬂict with the goal of maximizing their ﬁrm’s value.37 Agency-
cost essentialists—who believe that the reduction of agency costs is the
essential role of corporate law and of related ﬁelds such as securities
regulation—consistently evaluate policy recommendations solely in terms
of their capacity to decrease agency costs.38 And the essentialists con-
demn governance arrangements such as concentrated ownership and
dual-class shares, which restrict shareholders’ ability to hold managers
accountable.39 Yet investors also generate costs when they exercise con-
trol or hold managers accountable. Because they disregard such costs,
agency-cost essentialists have difficulty explaining common features of
the governance structures that most ﬁrms adopt.
A. The Jensen-Meckling Model and Its Extensions
Although keen observers have been commenting on the problem of
agency costs since antiquity,40 the most inﬂuential modern analysis of
agency costs in business firms is Jensen and Meckling’s 1976 article, Theory
of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure.41 The
article employs a simple model of a ﬁrm owned jointly by an investor and
a manager.42 The manager runs the ﬁrm while the investor provides
capital that, in combination with capital contributed by the manager,
36. See John Armour, Henry Hansmann & Reiner Kraakman, Agency Problems and
Legal Strategies, in The Anatomy of Corporate Law, supra note 17, at 35, 35–37
(introducing owner–management conﬂict as one of three “generic agency problems” that
arise in corporate law).
37. See infra notes 130–136 and accompanying text.
38. See, e.g., infra section IV.B.
39. See, e.g., Bebchuk et al., Stock Pyramids, supra note 7, at 296 (noting that when
controlling shareholders have limited cash-ﬂow rights, agency costs can be “an order of
magnitude larger” than when the controllers hold a majority of cash-ﬂow rights).
40. See John 10:12–13 (New International Version) (“The hired hand is not the
shepherd and does not own the sheep. So when he sees the wolf coming, he abandons the
sheep and runs away. Then the wolf attacks the flock and scatters it. The man runs away
because he is a hired hand and cares nothing for the sheep.”).
41. Jensen & Meckling, supra note 1.
42. Id. at 312–14.
776 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 117:767
enables the ﬁrm to achieve economies of scale.43 But the use of the
investor’s capital has a downside. The manager must give the investor a
cut of the cash ﬂows that the ﬁrm generates, introducing a separation
between ownership (the right to cash ﬂows) and control (the right to run
the ﬁrm).44 This separation creates incentives for the manager to engage
in self-seeking behavior that reduces the ﬁrm’s value.45 He no longer has
incentive to work as hard, as the sharing of cash ﬂows with the investor
reduces his marginal returns from working relative to his marginal
returns from leisure.46 His reduced diligence may, in turn, lead him to
make mistakes that a better-motivated manager would avoid. The sharing
of cash ﬂows also increases the manager’s incentive to divert the ﬁrm’s
resources to himself in the form of perquisites47 because he bears only
part of the cost of doing so.
Jensen and Meckling used their simple model of a business ﬁrm to
illustrate the unavoidable tradeoff between economies of scale and agency
costs. Economies of scale and agency costs both increase as the ﬁrm’s
manager sells more of the cash flows to the investor in exchange for more
capital. The optimal division of cash ﬂows between investor and manager
is the one that maximizes economies of scale net of agency costs.48 In this
way, the Jensen-Meckling model shows how the tradeoff between scale
economies and agency costs determines the size of a business ﬁrm.
A second important contribution of the Jensen-Meckling article is its
analysis of the various components of agency costs.49 Such costs do not
consist solely of the direct costs of managerial self-seeking behavior. They
also include monitoring costs, which result from efforts by investors to
deter managers from shirking and diverting.50 And they further include
bonding costs, which result from efforts by managers to reassure invest-
ors that, despite the separation of ownership and control, the managers
will work diligently and scrupulously.51 Managers rationally incur bonding
costs because investors who trust them will charge them less for the use
of their capital. Thus, as deﬁned by Jensen and Meckling, agency costs
43. See id. at 312.
44. Id. at 312–13.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. See id. at 312. For example, the manager is more likely to move his modest office
to a nicer building, to hire more underlings so that he can work shorter hours and enjoy
being the boss, and to invest the ﬁrm’s resources in projects in which he has a personal
interest.
48. Id. at 319–26 (exploring the relationship between acceptance of outside ﬁnan-
cing to increase ﬁrm size and resulting agency costs).
49. Id. at 308–10.
50. Id. at 308 n.9 (noting that monitoring costs result from “efforts on the part of the
principal to ‘control’ the behavior of the agent”).
51. Id. at 308.
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have three components: bonding costs, monitoring costs, and the direct
costs of agent misconduct that bonding and monitoring do not prevent.52
The Jensen-Meckling model has been extraordinarily inﬂuential.53
Delaware courts have used it to frame their analyses of managerial
ﬁduciary duties.54 Among scholars of corporate law, agency costs are the
focus of debates over controversial topics such as executive compen-
sation,55 hostile takeovers,56 class actions and derivative suits,57 director
self-dealing,58 the role of institutional investors,59 the role of activist invest-
52. Id. Jensen and Meckling called these direct costs “residual loss.” Id. An example
would be the loss of ﬁrm value caused by undeterred managerial shirking, net of the
private beneﬁt to the manager of that shirking.
53. A Westlaw search of the term “agency costs” yields over 7,000 results. Westlaw,
http://westlaw.com/ (search “‘agency costs’”; then follow “Secondary Sources” hyperlink)
(last visited Jan. 28, 2017).
54. See, e.g., Bird v. Lida, Inc., 681 A.2d 399, 402–03 (Del. Ch. 1996) (citing Jensen
and Meckling for the proposition that “imperfect alignment of incentives will inevitably
lead to excess costs associated with centralized management”).
55. See, e.g., Lucian Ayre Bebchuk & Jesse Fried, Executive Compensation as an
Agency Problem, 17 J. Econ. Persp. 71, 71–72 (2003) (referencing the Jensen-Meckling
model and noting that “[a]ny discussion of executive compensation must proceed against
the background of the fundamental agency problem afflicting management decision-
making”); Robert J. Jackson, Jr., Private Equity and Executive Compensation, 60 UCLA L.
Rev. 638, 646 (2013) (citing Jensen and Meckling to support the suggestion that tying
executive compensation to ﬁrm performance may reduce agency costs by better
motivating executives to maximize shareholder value).
56. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target’s
Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 Harv. L. Rev. 1161, 1169 (1981)
[hereinafter Easterbrook & Fischel, The Proper Role] (emphasizing the role of hostile
takeovers “in monitoring the performance of corporate managers” and citing Jensen and
Meckling); Ronald J. Gilson, A Structural Approach to Corporations: The Case Against
Defensive Tactics in Tender Offers, 33 Stan. L. Rev. 819, 836–45 (1981) [hereinafter
Gilson, Structural Approach] (arguing that defensive tactics are inappropriate because of
the importance of a “market for corporate control” as a means of reducing agency costs).
57. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding the Plaintiff’s Attorney: The
Implications of Economic Theory for Private Enforcement of Law Through Class and
Derivative Actions, 86 Colum. L. Rev. 669, 680 & n.30 (1986) (noting the “high ‘agency
costs’ associated with class and derivative actions” and citing Jensen and Meckling);
Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Plaintiffs’ Attorney’s Role in Class Action and
Derivative Litigation: Economic Analysis and Recommendations for Reform, 58 U. Chi. L.
Rev. 1, 19–26 (1991) (applying Jensen and Meckling’s theory to class and derivative
actions); Elliot J. Weiss & John S. Beckerman, Let the Money Do the Monitoring: How
Institutional Investors Can Reduce Agency Costs in Securities Class Actions, 104 Yale L.J.
2053, 2064–66 (1995) (analyzing agency-cost issues and the misalignment of incentives
between plaintiffs’ attorneys and plaintiff classes in securities class actions).
58. See, e.g., Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, Reinventing the Outside
Director: An Agenda for Institutional Investors, 43 Stan. L. Rev. 863, 867 & n.11 (1991)
(discussing agency costs that exist when a corporate-governance system balances manage-
ment discretion and safeguards against abuse).
59. See, e.g., Black, supra note 26, at 887 (“Procedural reform can facilitate
shareholder action, but oversight will occur only if the costs of monitoring are less than
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ors,60 and shareholder rights to amend corporate bylaws and charters.61
Inspired by Jensen and Meckling, many scholars assert that corporate law
should be reformed to give more power to shareholders. For example,
such scholars condemn corporate-governance structures that insulate
incumbent managers against hostile takeovers and activist hedge funds.62
And they apply similar reasoning to the conﬂict between controlling
shareholders and minority shareholders, focusing on the potential for
controllers to oppress the minority.63
B. The Blind Spots of Agency-Cost Essentialism
By necessity, models make simplifying assumptions that limit their
explanatory reach. The Jensen-Meckling model is no exception. How-
ever, in deriving policy prescriptions from it, many scholars have ignored
those limitations. As a result, they effectively assume that, at any given
the beneﬁts from reducing the agency costs that ﬂow from the separation of ownership
and control in our large companies.”); John C. Coffee, Jr., Liquidity Versus Control: The
Institutional Investor as Corporate Monitor, 91 Colum. L. Rev. 1277, 1283–84 (1991) (“Not
only do the same problems of agency cost arise at the institutional investor level, but there
are persuasive reasons for believing that some institutional investors are less accountable
to their ‘owners’ than are corporate managements to their shareholders.”).
60. See, e.g., Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Agency Costs of Agency
Capitalism: Activist Investors and the Revaluation of Governance Rights, 113 Colum. L.
Rev. 863, 870–71 (2013) (referencing the Jensen-Meckling model to contextualize an
analysis of agency costs that arise with activist investors); Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock,
Hedge Funds in Corporate Governance and Corporate Control, 155 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1021,
1048 (2007) [hereinafter Kahan & Rock, Hedge Funds] (noting that agency costs might
limit mutual funds’ “ability to act as effective monitors”); Mark J. Roe, Corporate Short-
Termism—In the Boardroom and in the Courtroom, 68 Bus. Law. 977, 1005 (2013)
(referencing short-term distortions that are internal to corporations as the result of the
manager–investor dichotomy).
61. See, e.g., Bebchuk, Shareholder Power, supra note 8, at 903–06 (referencing
Jensen and Meckling for the proposition that “high leverage produces its own inefficiency
distortions” and citing “shareholder power to make distribution decisions” as a possible
solution).
62. See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk, Alon Brav & Wei Jiang, The Long-Term Effects of
Hedge Fund Activism, 115 Colum. L. Rev. 1085, 1136 n.99 (2015) [hereinafter Bebchuk et
al., Long-Term] (noting scholarly criticism of hedge fund activism); Lucian A. Bebchuk,
The Myth that Insulating Boards Serves Long-Term Value, 113 Colum. L. Rev. 1637, 1686–
87 (2013) [hereinafter Bebchuk, Insulating Boards] (rejecting arguments for board
insulation and claiming such isolation produces costs that exceed beneﬁts); Easterbrook &
Fischel, The Proper Role, supra note 56, at 1198–99 (suggesting that courts should not
freely defer to managers who resist tender offers); Gilson, Structural Approach, supra note
56, at 845–46 (“[T]he tender offer is crucial because no other displacement mechanism is
available without management cooperation.”).
63. For example, a recent paper addresses the risk of self-dealing by controllers by
calling for “enhanced-independence directors” who are accountable to minority share-
holders. See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Assaf Hamdani, Making Independent Directors Work,
165 U. Pa. L. Rev. (forthcoming May 2017) (manuscript at 63–64), http://papers.ssrn.com/
abstract=2741738 (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review).
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scale of production, the only relevant governance goal is to minimize
agency costs.64 While this is true in the Jensen-Meckling model, it is not
true in real business ﬁrms.
One of the Jensen-Meckling model’s simplifying assumptions is that
the manager possesses all discretionary control rights—by which we mean
rights to select and implement the ﬁrm’s business strategy. Not only does
the investor lack formal power to select the ﬁrm’s strategy, but he also
cannot inﬂuence it by, for example, threatening to replace the manager
for pursuing a plan the investor thinks unwise.65 The investor’s only
control rights in the model are duty-enforcement rights, by which we mean
rights to enforce contractual obligations, and judge-made ﬁduciary
duties, designed to deter self-seeking conduct by the manager.66 It is the
exercise of these rights that generates what Jensen and Meckling called
monitoring costs. 67 By disabling their investor from participating in
discretionary control, Jensen and Meckling created a ﬁrm that can
change along only one dimension: the amount of outside capital.
A second limiting assumption in the model is that no one makes
honest mistakes. While the manager does not always advance the in-
terests of the investor, he serves his own interests ﬂawlessly. He selects the
business strategy most proﬁtable to him and executes it without error.
Similarly, the investor always exercises his duty-enforcement rights in the
manner that minimizes agency costs. In other words, he engages only in
efficient monitoring. The model thus ignores competence costs. The only
costs that matter, at any given scale of production, are conﬂict costs,
resulting from the separation of ownership and control. And these arise
only because of actual and potential self-seeking conduct by the manager.
In real ﬁrms, managers generate costs not just by deliberately shirking
and diverting but also by making unwise decisions attributable to a lack
of expertise, information, or innate ability.68 And investors make such
mistakes as well, including by hiring the wrong managers. But such mis-
takes are not part of the Jensen-Meckling model.
64. See, e.g., Bebchuk et al., Stock Pyramids, supra note 7, at 295–96, 314 (examining
agency-controlling-minority-structure ﬁrms and stating “the case for regulation is made if
the agency costs of these structures are large and there is strong evidence of a divergence
between private and social beneﬁts in their creation”).
65. See Jensen & Meckling, supra note 1, at 313–14 (assuming investors lack voting
rights).
66. For further discussion of such discretionary control rights and duty-enforcement
rights, see infra section III.B.
67. See Jensen & Meckling, supra note 1, at 313; see also id. at 308 n.9 (noting that
monitoring “includes efforts on the part of the principal to ‘control’ the behavior of the
agent through budget restrictions, compensation policies, operating rules etc.”).
68. See infra section II.A.2 (discussing agent competence costs).
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In combination, these two limiting assumptions of the Jensen-
Meckling model exclude principal costs. This exclusion is reasonable
given Jensen and Meckling’s objective, which was to show how agent
conﬂict costs limit a ﬁrm’s scale of production. Their model achieves this
objective elegantly. Moreover, the authors were careful to acknowledge
their model’s limitations.69 Yet many scholars have tried to apply the
model to a different question, namely the optimal division of control be-
tween investors and managers at any given level of production. And these
scholars have concluded, in effect, that minimizing agent conﬂict costs is
the only relevant objective when dividing control rights. Put another way,
these agency-cost essentialists effectively assume that the governance
structure that minimizes agent conﬂict costs also maximizes ﬁrm value,
thereby ignoring the impact of governance structure on principal costs.
As a result, they consistently advocate mandatory structures that would
increase the power of shareholders to hold managers accountable.70
By disregarding principal costs, agency-cost essentialists have diffi-
culty explaining why, even in a ﬁrm whose capital is provided by a single
investor, the investor often hires a manager to run the ﬁrm. Since the
investor provides all funding, the manager is not needed to achieve
economies of scale, which is the reason for the separation of ownership
and control in the Jensen-Meckling model.71 Recognizing this blind spot,
some scholars have explained their models with a story along the lines
that the entrepreneur provides the idea while the investor provides the
money.72 But that story is inadequate, as the investor could, in theory,
simply buy the idea from the entrepreneur. (In some ﬁrms, of course,
that is exactly what happens, but in many others it does not.) Only a
model that includes principal costs—starting with principal competence
costs—can explain why such investors hire managers.
69. See Jensen & Meckling, supra note 1, at 351–52 (noting the assumption “that all
outside equity is nonvoting” and that a future complete analysis “will require a careful
speciﬁcation of the contractual rights involved on both sides, the role of the board of
directors, and the coordination (agency) costs borne by the stockholders in implementing
policy changes”); id. at 356 (stating the theory “is applicable to a wide range of corpo-
rations” even though it is “in an incomplete state” and noting “[o]ne of the most serious
limitation[s] of the analysis is . . . its application to the very large modern corporation
whose managers own little or no equity”).
70. See, e.g., Bebchuk, Shareholder Power, supra note 8, at 851 (arguing that
“shareholders should have power, subject to procedural requirements, to initiate and
adopt rules-of-the-game decisions to amend the charter or to reincorporate in another
state” and explaining why).
71. See Jensen & Meckling, supra note 1, at 313.
72. See, e.g., Philippe Aghion & Patrick Bolton, An Incomplete Contracts Approach
to Financial Contracting, 59 Rev. Econ. Stud. 473, 475 (1992); Oliver Hart, Financial
Contracting, 39 J. Econ. Literature 1079, 1079 (2001).
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In addition to scale economies, Jensen and Meckling mentioned a
second reason why their model’s manager might raise funding from an
investor: diversiﬁcation.73 Even if the manager is wealthy enough to
capitalize the ﬁrm at optimal scale himself, he can diversify away nonsys-
tematic risk by allowing the investor to bear some of that risk instead.
However, while the beneﬁts of diversiﬁcation help explain why investors
might pool their funds when capitalizing a ﬁrm, they do not explain why
those investors often delegate control to managers instead of running
the ﬁrm jointly as copartners. Put more generally, neither of the
explanations that Jensen and Meckling offered for capital pooling—scale
economies and diversification—explains why investors frequently delegate
control instead of sharing it collectively.
A theory of business ﬁrms that excludes principal costs also has
difficulty explaining why, when investors do delegate control to managers,
they often further agree to tie their own hands, voluntarily limiting their
own rights to hold managers accountable. The most important accoun-
tability right is to replace the manager at will. Agency-cost essentialism
suggests that an investor’s power to replace a manager is extremely
valuable for deterring self-seeking managerial conduct.74 Yet many large
business ﬁrms adopt structures that strictly limit shareholders’ power to
remove and replace managers. For example, the standard corporate
form, which most public ﬁrms adopt, generally allows shareholders to
replace corporate directors only once per year, at the annual share-
holders meeting.75 In addition, many ﬁrms adopt a staggered board
whose members serve three-year terms and cannot be removed mid-term
except for cause.76 Private equity funds restrict the termination power
even further: Investors typically have no right to replace managers, to
whom they commit their funds for at least ten years.77 Meanwhile, ﬁrms
such as Google and Facebook have adopted dual-class-share structures
73. Jensen & Meckling, supra note 1, at 313 n.15.
74. See, e.g., Bebchuk, Shareholder Power, supra note 8, at 899–901 (discussing how
“insulation from takeover threats results in greater consumption of private beneﬁts by
executives”).
75. See, e.g., Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 211(b) (2016).
76. See, e.g., id. § 141(d). In the S&P 500, however, staggered boards have lost preva-
lence, with only eighty-four companies currently holding staggered elections. Carol Bowie,
ISS 2016 Board Practices Study, Harv. L. Sch. Forum on Corp. Governance & Fin. Reg.
(June 1, 2016), http://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2016/06/01/iss-2016-board-practices-study/
[http://perma.cc/JW5J-YA69].
77. See Steven N. Kaplan & Per Strömberg, Leveraged Buyouts and Private Equity, 23
J. Econ. Persp. 121, 123 (2009) (“After committing their capital, the limited partners have
little say in how the general partner deploys the investment funds, as long as the basic
covenants of the fund agreement are followed.”).
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that prevent public investors from replacing directors at all.78 Agency-cost
essentialism, under which investors hold control rights solely for the
purpose of deterring managerial misconduct, struggles to explain why
investors would place their capital with ﬁrms possessing such governance
structures.
This shortcoming of an exclusive focus on agency costs can be seen
in the Jensen-Meckling model itself. In the model, all of the investor’s
control rights serve to reduce agent conﬂict costs, and the exercise of any
such right generates monitoring costs.79 But the possibility of monitoring
costs would not justify restricting the investor’s power to exercise control.
The model assumes that the investor accurately estimates expected agent
conﬂict costs and otherwise avoids mistakes in the exercise of his control
rights.80 Therefore, he will incur the monitoring costs associated with the
exercise of a control right when doing so reduces overall agency costs. In
other words, he will exercise a control right only when doing so is
efficient. For this reason, the model’s logic supplies no reason to limit
the investor’s powers, including the power to replace the manager at will.
Some scholars have invoked the notion of nonpecuniary beneﬁts of
control to explain why investors in some ﬁrms agree to tie their own
hands.81 The explanation assumes that managers differ in how much they
intrinsically enjoy running the firm, and that managers who are especially
fond of control are willing to give up some pecuniary compensation to
78. See Alphabet Inc. & Google Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 85 (Feb. 11,
2016); Facebook, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 25 (Jan. 28, 2016); Brad Stone,
Facebook Will Form 2 Classes of Stock, N.Y. Times (Nov. 24, 2009), http://www.nytimes.
com/2009/11/25/technology/internet/25facebook.html (on file with the Columbia Law
Review); James Surowiecki, Unequal Shares, New Yorker (May 28, 2012), http://www.
newyorker.com/magazine/2012/05/28/unequal-shares [http://perma.cc/H8ZW-M7PN];
Simon C.Y. Wong, Google’s Stock-Split Plan Would Replace Stewardship with Dictatorship,
Harv. Bus. Rev. (Apr. 18, 2012), http://hbr.org/2012/04/googles-stock-split-plan-would/
[http://perma.cc/B8T9-6YBU].
79. The original Jensen-Meckling model assumes that managers are homogeneous in
their propensity to shirk and divert. See Jensen & Meckling, supra note 1, at 314. Given
this assumption, replacing the manager would not improve the ﬁrm’s performance and
indeed will reduce its value due to the transaction costs associated with termination and
replacement. For this reason, threats by the investor to terminate the manager will not be
credible. In order for the termination right to be an effective monitoring device, agents
must be heterogeneous in their propensity to act disloyally and investors must be unable
to ascertain, at the time they hire the manager, that the manager’s propensity is less than
the propensity of other, equally competent manager candidates who might become avail-
able for hire.
80. See id. at 313 (“Prospective minority shareholders will realize that the owner-
manager’s interests will diverge somewhat from theirs[;] hence the price which they will
pay for shares will reﬂect the monitoring costs and the effect of the divergence between
the manager’s interest and theirs.”).
81. The nonpecuniary benefits of control are an essential part of the Jensen-Meckling
model. See id. at 312.
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obtain more of it. Such managers will therefore strike a deal with inves-
tors: The investors agree to limitations on their powers to hold managers
accountable, in exchange for which the managers give the investors a
larger share of the cash-ﬂow rights, which the investors require to be
willing to invest in a ﬁrm in which agency costs will presumably be high.82
A governance theory in which control-hungry managers trade pay
for power may explain the division of control rights in some ﬁrms, but it
is not a plausible explanation for the full range of governance structures
that ﬁrms adopt, nor can it explain the ﬁnancial performance of ﬁrms
that allocate most control to managers. The theory implies that when
returns to both investors and managers are taken into account, ﬁrms that
tie investors’ hands will, as a result of high agent costs, consistently gene-
rate lower returns on assets. As, however, we discuss in Part IV, ﬁrms with
dual-class shares and other manager-empowering governance features do
not, on average, deliver lower returns than ﬁrms lacking such features.83
In short, agency-cost essentialism, even when supplemented with a
theory of managers who are heterogeneous in their love of control for its
own sake, explains neither the variety nor the performance of gover-
nance structures that ﬁrms actually adopt. A satisfying explanation for
the governance-control spectrum recognizes that investors can also ge-
nerate conﬂict costs and, more fundamentally, that both investors and
managers can generate competence costs.
II. CONTROLCOSTS: THE PROBLEMS OF COMPETENCE AND CONFLICT
To produce ﬁrm value—meaning the value of the goods or services
that a ﬁrm produces minus the cost of the resources it consumes in
producing them—someone must exercise control over the ﬁrm. Regard-
less of whether that someone is an investor, a hired manager, or both, the
creation of ﬁrm value requires that someone select the business strategy
and then execute it by hiring (and, when necessary, ﬁring) employees,
timing product launches, and so on. Both components—strategy and
execution—require control. Therefore, the main beneﬁt of control in
business ﬁrms, exercised through the efficient use of effort, expertise,
and talent, is the creation of ﬁrm value.84
82. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk, A Rent-Protection Theory of Corporate Ownership
and Control 3 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 7203, 1999), http://
papers.ssrn.com/abstract=168990 (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (noting the
common separation of cash-flow and voting rights and its implications for gaining control).
83. See infra section IV.A (arguing that there is no correlation across ﬁrms between
governance structures and ﬁnancial returns).
84. Additionally, the process of creating ﬁrm value can generate harmless non-
pecuniary beneﬁts, such as the psychic enjoyment of exercising control. See, e.g., Ronald
J. Gilson, Controlling Shareholders and Corporate Governance: Complicating the
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At the same time, the exercise of control also generates costs that
sap ﬁrm value. Control costs can be categorized based on whose actions
are the source of the cost (principals or agents) and on the problem that
explains the cost (incompetence or conﬂict). With respect to the ﬁrst
distinction, we deﬁne principal costs as costs attributable to the exercise
of control by investors, and agent costs as costs attributable to the
exercise of control by managers. With respect to the second distinction,
we deﬁne competence costs as the costs of honest mistakes and of efforts
to avoid such mistakes, and conﬂict costs as the costs of self-seeking
conduct and of efficient efforts to prevent such conduct. We refer to
efficient efforts to prevent self-seeking conduct because a cost resulting
from, for example, overspending on monitoring—such as the incurring
of $100 in monitoring expenses to prevent only $50 in misconduct—
would constitute a mistake and should therefore be considered a
competence cost rather than a conﬂict cost.85
Combining the two distinctions yields four categories of control
costs: principal competence costs, principal conﬂict costs, agent compe-
tence costs, and agent conﬂict costs. A governance structure that maxi-
mizes ﬁrm value allocates control in the manner that minimizes the sum
of costs across the four categories. Any shift of control among principals
and agents entails tradeoffs among the categories, with the net effect of
the shift—and thus the optimal control structure—depending on ﬁrm-
speciﬁc characteristics.
Our distinction between principals and agents requires a note of
clariﬁcation. We generally use the term principal to refer to an investor
and agent to refer to a manager. In many ﬁrms, however, this distinction
is blurred by the presence of managers who have also contributed
capital.86 One solution would be to deﬁne degrees of “principalness” and
“agentness,” but this would probably introduce more complexity than it
is worth. To keep things simple, we deﬁne agents as parties whose share
of the discretionary control rights exceeds their share of the cash-ﬂow
rights, and principals as parties whose share of the cash-ﬂow rights equals
Comparative Taxonomy, 119 Harv. L. Rev. 1641, 1663–64 (2006) [hereinafter Gilson,
Complicating the Comparative Taxonomy] (deﬁning nonpecuniary private beneﬁts of
control as “forms of psychic and other beneﬁts that, without more, involve no transfer of
real company resources and do not disproportionately dilute the value of the company’s
stock to a diversiﬁed investor”).
85. Just as an investor who overspends on monitoring generates principal compe-
tence costs, a manager who overspends on bonding generates agent competence costs.
86. See Kevin J. Murphy, Executive Compensation: Where We Are, and How We Got
There, in 2A Handbook of the Economics of Finance 211, 217–18 (George M.
Constantinides, Milton Harris & Rene Stulz eds., 2013) (reviewing the various ways that
executive compensation can be measured).
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or exceeds their share of the discretionary control rights.87 As applied to
most corporate-governance structures, these deﬁnitions are workable and
accord with common usage. Thus, although a principal–agent relation-
ship exists between a corporation’s board of directors and its officers, this
Essay treats them as a uniﬁed agent. If the corporation is widely held, the
shareholders are the principals; if instead the ﬁrm has a controlling
shareholder (holding a control block either of common shares or of the
vote-controlling shares in a dual-class share structure88), the controller is
the agent along with the directors and officers, and the noncontrolling
shareholders are the principals.89 To be sure, when the parties share power
in a more complicated division of control among investors and mana-
gers, it is harder to determine who has more control rights than cash-ﬂow
rights. But such arrangements are not common enough to negate the
utility of the deﬁnitions of principal and agent we employ here.90
We now elaborate upon each of the categories of control cost within
our framework.
A. Competence Costs
Standard principal–agent models often skip over a threshold ques-
tion: Why does the principal hire the agent? If the investor can provide
all of the needed capital, the investor could avoid the troublesome
separation of ownership and control by running the ﬁrm as well. The
suggestion that the manager’s role in such a firm is to provide the business
idea is inadequate, as the investor could buy the idea from the would-be
manager.91 A more compelling explanation for the separation of owner-
ship and control—the font of all conﬂict costs—is competence. Investors
hire managers who can run a business more competently than they can,
thereby increasing ﬁrm value.92 Therefore, competence costs—or, more
87. This deﬁnition departs from the common-law deﬁnition of a principal–agent
relationship, which requires as an “essential element” that the principal exercise ultimate
control. Restatement (Third) of Agency § 1.01 cmt. f (Am. Law Inst. 2005); see also
Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2666–67 (2013) (citing the Restatement for its
control requirement). In this Essay’s terminology, an investor who has no control rights is
still a principal, and a manager who administers the investor’s capital is still an agent.
88. See Goshen & Hamdani, supra note 13, at 591–92 (describing control-block
arrangements and resulting costs).
89. In ﬁrms with dual-class shares, the noncontrolling shareholders include the
shareholders holding the inferior shares as well as any minority holders of the superior
shares. Id. at 590.
90. For example, minority shareholders who can affect a voting result (for example,
by holding out) are still principals even though, with respect to the speciﬁc vote, their
share of control may exceed their share of the cash-ﬂow rights.
91. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
92. The idea of relative competence is similar to the well-known concept of the divi-
sion of labor, according to which workers specialize in different tasks. See Gary S. Becker &
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speciﬁcally, principal competence costs—are the problem that all gover-
nance structures are ultimately designed to solve.
1. Principal Competence Costs. — By delegating control to managers,
investors reduce principal competence costs, at the inevitable price of
higher agent costs. Delegation is efficient as long as the principal com-
petence costs thereby avoided exceed the other types of control costs
thereby created.
To illustrate this tradeoff, consider a hypothetical investor, Mark,
who wishes to use his personal wealth to build a stock portfolio. Although
Mark could pick stocks himself, he lacks knowledge of business and
ﬁnance and thus would make mistakes. He might pick stocks that are
overpriced, fail to diversify, or incur avoidable taxes. None of these costs
would result from a conﬂict of interests: Mark would be managing his
own money and therefore internalizing all beneﬁts and costs of his
actions. His mistakes would not, in other words, result from shirking or
diverting. They would be honest mistakes, resulting from a simple lack of
competence.
To reduce the expected costs of his own mistakes, Mark could acquire
the requisite expertise and information, but he would then incur oppor-
tunity costs.93 And he still might make honest mistakes due to cognitive
shortcomings, such as overconﬁdence and a lack of objectivity,94 which
investment in greater information and expertise might not correct. The
costs of Mark’s honest mistakes, as well as the costs of his efforts to make
fewer mistakes while exercising control, would constitute competence
costs—in particular, principal competence costs.95 Put generally, princi-
pal competence costs can result from a lack of information and expertise
(which can be acquired, but at a cost), and also from person-speciﬁc
cognitive shortcomings (which may not be correctable at any cost).
To reduce principal competence costs, Mark could hire Peggy, a
stock-market expert, to manage his portfolio. In this way, Mark would
Kevin M. Murphy, The Division of Labor, Coordination Costs, and Knowledge, in Human
Capital: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis with Special Reference to Education 299,
300–01 (3d ed. 1993). While most discussions of the division of labor focus on ﬁrms’
internal operations, our discussion of competence costs is concerned with firms’ governance
structures.
93. See generally Jeffrey M. Perloff, Microeconomics 186 (6th ed. 2012).
94. See generally Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral
Science: Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 Calif. L. Rev.
1051, 1084–102 (2000) (explaining the effects of cognitive biases on behavior).
95. Legal scholars frequently cite differences in expertise and information as reasons
that shareholders delegate authority to corporate boards. See, e.g., Donald J. Smythe,
Shareholder Democracy and the Economic Purpose of the Corporation, 63 Wash. & Lee
L. Rev. 1407, 1409 (2006) (noting that shareholders frequently lack expertise in, and know-
ledge of, corporations’ business activities and thus are “quite content” to delegate authority
to boards and executives).
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exploit the key economic beneﬁts of the division of labor: He would
assign tasks to a person who, perhaps through years of specialization,
possesses information and expertise that permit her to make decisions
more quickly and with fewer mistakes.96 But the mere hiring of Peggy will
not eliminate all principal competence costs. Accountability costs, a form
of principal competence costs, may arise. Mark is likely to retain certain
control rights, such as the right to ﬁre Peggy, in order to hold her ac-
countable in her job performance. If the portfolio’s performance under
her control is lackluster, Peggy might try to save her job by telling Mark
that the underperformance is temporary. At this point, Mark might not
know whether Peggy is brilliant and telling the truth or is incompetent
and lazy, covering weak performance with lies. In deciding between these
possibilities, the very lack of competence in evaluating stocks that led
Mark to hire Peggy could impair his evaluation of her performance. He
might retain her even though she is bungling or unscrupulous (a false
negative), or he might replace her even though she is brilliant and honest
(a false positive).97 The loss of value from such mistakes reﬂects principal
competence costs.
Less drastically, Mark might force Peggy to submit regular perfor-
mance reports that distract her from her work yet do little to improve
Mark’s decisionmaking.98 Such overmonitoring would constitute a princi-
pal competence cost as well. The implication is that, as long as principals
96. The idea of the division of labor dates to the beginnings of economic theory. See
Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations 3–23 (Edwin Cannan ed., Random House, Inc. 2000)
(1776) (describing the origins, beneﬁts, and limitations of the division of labor). There-
after, the idea was developed to explore tradeoffs associated with specialization. See, e.g.,
Becker & Murphy, supra note 92, at 300–04 (exploring the relationship between specia-
lization and coordination); Patrick Bolton & Mathias Dewatripont, The Firm as a
Communication Network, 109 Q.J. Econ. 809, 810–11 (describing, in the context of infor-
mation processing, the tradeoff between the efficiencies of agent specialization and
increased communication costs); Sherwin Rosen, Specialization and Human Capital, 1 J.
Lab. Econ. 43, 44 (1983) (exploring the relationship between specialization and private
incentives). However, this literature, unlike this Essay, assumes that specialization enables
all principals and all agents to reach the same levels of competence.
97. To protect herself, Peggy might select a portfolio that will never outperform the
market but never temporarily underperform it either, or a portfolio composed of stocks
whose merits she can easily explain to Mark. See, e.g., Sunil Wahal & John J. McConnell,
Do Institutional Investors Exacerbate Managerial Myopia?, 6 J. Corp. Fin. 307, 326–27
(2000) (concluding “share ownership by institutional investors appears to allow US corpo-
rate managers to invest more in projects with long-term payoffs than would direct share
ownership by individual investors” because individual investors are “less patient”).
98. See Mike Burkart, Denis Gromb & Fausto Panunzi, Large Shareholders,
Monitoring, and the Value of the Firm, 112 Q.J. Econ. 693, 693–94 (1997) (presenting a
model of the tradeoff between monitoring and managers’ investment incentives); see also
Philippe Aghion & Jean Tirole, Formal and Real Authority in Organizations, 105 J. Pol.
Econ. 1 (1997) (developing a seminal theory of the allocation of formal and real authority
between a principal and an agent, and exploring the tradeoffs among agent incentives,
communication costs, and principal control).
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retain powers to replace agents or otherwise hold them accountable, they
will still generate principal competence costs.
The Mark–Peggy relationship illustrates the sources of principal
costs that are present even if a principal–agent relationship has only one
principal. When principals exist as a group—as they do in a corporation
with multiple shareholders—principal competence costs may be even
higher. If investors exercise control rights jointly, then each will have to
monitor the ﬁrm’s operations and acquire the relevant expertise to make
informed contributions to collective decisions. Such efforts are them-
selves competence costs, as their purpose is to avoid honest mistakes.
Moreover, the efforts will largely be duplicative, as each investor will, with
respect to any particular joint decision, seek to acquire the same expertise
and information. It therefore may be efficient for the group to delegate
decisionmaking to a collective agent, thereby reducing principal com-
petence costs from duplicative efforts. Costs will fall even further if the
selected agent already has the requisite expertise, which will enable the
principals to exploit the beneﬁts of specialization. In such a setting, there
is a tradeoff between the principal costs that arise from collective
decisionmaking and the agent costs that arise if control is concentrated
in the hands of an individual acting on behalf of investors as a group.99
2. Agent Competence Costs. — Models concerned with the problem of
agency costs tend to assume that the only reason managers ever harm
their ﬁrms is the misalignment of incentives caused by the separation of
ownership and control.100 But of course managers also make honest mis-
takes, generating agent competence costs. The magnitude of the costs
will vary with the manager: Intelligent, informed, and unbiased managers
make fewer mistakes than dull, ignorant, and biased managers. To return
to the Mark–Peggy example, if Peggy picks a bad stock because she uses a
ﬂawed evaluation method, her mistake will be a source of agent compe-
tence costs. Similarly, if overconﬁdent corporate managers are too opti-
mistic about a proposed project,101 their decision to devote corporate
funds to the project will also generate agent competence costs. As Part III
discusses, the types of accountability mechanisms that principals use to
reduce agent competence costs tend to differ from those used to reduce
agent conﬂict costs.
99. Group decisionmaking also entails coordination costs. See Hansmann, supra note
19, at 277–80 (analyzing the costs of collective decisionmaking).
100. This is, for instance, the essence of the Jensen-Meckling model. See Jensen &
Meckling, supra note 1, at 308–10.
101. See Susanna Kim Ripken, Predictions, Projections, and Precautions: Conveying
Cautionary Warnings in Corporate Forward-Looking Statements, 2005 U. Ill. L. Rev. 929,
958–65 (explaining manifestations and consequences of managerial overconﬁdence and
optimism bias). See generally Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 94, at 1091–92 (explaining the
effects of overconﬁdence biases).
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3. A Firm’s Total Competence Costs. — The division of control between
principals and agents in a ﬁrm determines the total level of competence
costs, and ﬁrm-speciﬁc characteristics determine the cost-minimizing
division. Because the probability of a mistake depends on the competence
levels of individual decisionmakers, investors who are knowledgeable
about business matters will typically delegate less control to managers
than those who are uninformed.
Competence can be activity speciﬁc. A hedge fund manager might
be good at picking stocks and managing a portfolio but bad at running a
company. Similarly, an entrepreneur might be good at identifying business
opportunities but bad at managing people. We can expect organizations
to allocate control accordingly.102
A ﬁrm’s overall competence in decisionmaking might also depend
on the type of business the ﬁrm is engaged in. Mistakes are more likely in
ﬁrms that are complex in terms of size, technology, or geographic scope
of operations. Complexity makes honest mistakes more likely and chal-
lenges investors by impeding the evaluation of managerial performance.103
Therefore, when a ﬁrm is in a complex industry, its investors are more
likely to make mistakes when evaluating managers and deciding whether
to replace them.104 Similarly, when investors use a ﬁrm’s public stock
price as a performance proxy, market imperfections can lead investors to
misevaluate managerial competence and loyalty.105
102. See, e.g., Viral V. Acharya, Marc Gabarro & Paolo F. Volpin, Competition for
Managers, Corporate Governance and Incentive Compensation 29 (May 2012) (unpublished
manuscript), http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~sternﬁn/vacharya/public_html/AGV_paper_
110512.pdf [http://perma.cc/RB9D-N8AP] (“[W]hen managerial ability is observable
and managerial skills are scarce, competition among ﬁrms to hire better managers implies
that in equilibrium ﬁrms will choose lower levels of corporate governance.”).
103. See, e.g., Mustafa Ciftci, Baruch Lev & Suresh Radhakrishnan, Is Research and
Development Mispriced or Properly Risk Adjusted?, 26 J. Acct. Auditing & Fin. 81, 97–109
(2011) (presenting empirical evidence suggesting that investors undervalue ﬁrms with
research-and-development spending); Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, Equilibrium
Short Horizons of Investors and Firms, 80 Am. Econ. Rev. 148, 151 (1990) (observing that
the complexity of long-term projects leads managers to pursue short-term projects that are
easier for outsiders to evaluate).
104. Managers will account for this risk by limiting investors’ right to replace them.
This can explain why we observe more dual-class share structures among high-tech ﬁrms
such as Google, Facebook, and LinkedIn. For a similar analysis, see Goshen & Hamdani,
supra note 13, at 590 (discussing examples of prominent technology corporations that
utilize dual-class share structures and noting that such structures “provide[] the
entrepreneur with maximum ability to realize her idiosyncratic vision”).
105. Markets may become imperfect due to misevaluations (e.g., insufficiently
informed trading) or limits on arbitrage (e.g., inefficient or myopic markets). See, e.g.,
Victor L. Bernard & Jacob K. Thomas, Evidence that Stock Prices Do Not Fully Reﬂect the
Implications of Current Earnings for Future Earnings, 13 J. Acct. & Econ. 305, 308 (1990)
(arguing “market-efficiency anomaly is rooted in a failure of information to ﬂow
completely into price”); Lynn A. Stout, The Mechanisms of Market Inefficiency: An
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Besides differing in probability, control mistakes can differ in magni-
tude. Important determinants of a mistake’s magnitude include the levels
of competition in the ﬁrm’s product market and in the input markets
where the ﬁrm acquires capital, materials, and employees.106 A mistake
could either bankrupt a firm or barely dent its earnings, depending on
whether the markets in which it operates are competitive or monopolistic.107
As the expected cost (the magnitude multiplied by the probability)
of a mistake increases, parties will be willing to expend more effort to
prevent it, such as by acquiring more expertise and information.108 Some
mistakes will, however, be unavoidable, in the sense that their expected
costs are less than the costs of avoiding them.109 Because mistakes can
result from managers’ intellectual and emotional endowments, the mis-
takes might be tolerable if the manager is otherwise competent or is
especially good at an aspect of management that is important to the ﬁrm.
But if the mistakes are unendurable, their prevention might necessitate
curtailing the manager’s control or hiring a replacement.
B. The Byproduct of Competence-Raising Delegation: Conﬂict Costs
Conﬂict costs—the ﬁxation of agency-cost essentialists110—are a deri-
vative form of control costs, as they arise only when investors attempt to
reduce competence costs by delegating control to managers. A sole pro-
prietor who runs his own business generates competence costs but not
Introduction to the New Finance, 28 J. Corp. L. 635, 653–55 (2003) (describing a “delayed
and incomplete market response” to major announcements and discussing real-world
factors that limit the power of arbitrage).
106. See, e.g., How Bad Decisions Can Lead to Billion-Dollar Mistakes,
Knowledge@Wharton (Feb. 22, 2001), http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article/how-
bad-decisions-can-lead-to-billion-dollar-mistakes/ [http://perma.cc/RE7F-TY2W] (noting
that a rush at Barings Bank to capitalize on market opportunities caused executives to fail
to implement sufficient oversight mechanisms, contributing to the bank’s collapse).
107. See, e.g., Douglas A. McIntyre et al., The Worst Business Decisions of All Time,
24/7 Wall St. (Oct. 17, 2012), http://247wallst.com/special-report/2012/10/17/the-worst-
business-decisions-of-all-time/2/ [http://perma.cc/8374-XHE7] (providing examples, such
as at Motorola, of circumstances in which market changes exacerbated the consequences
of bad business decisions).
108. The management-consulting industry is built on this need. See About Us,
McKinsey & Company, http://www.mckinsey.com/about-us/overview [http://perma.cc/
2XC7-S9VS] (last visited Nov. 2, 2016) (“McKinsey & Company is a global management
consulting ﬁrm that serves leading businesses, governments, non-governmental orga-
nizations, and not-for-proﬁts. We help our clients make lasting improvements to their
performance and realize their most important goals.”).
109. This is the same idea underlying the deﬁnition of negligence in the law-and-
economics literature. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. Legal Stud.
29, 33 (1972) (“When the cost of accidents is less than the cost of prevention, a rational
proﬁt-maximizing enterprise will pay tort judgments to the accident victims rather than
incur the larger cost of avoiding liability.”).
110. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
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conflict costs.111 Rather, conflict costs—the result of intentional, self-seek-
ing conduct in the operation of a business ﬁrm—arise only when parties
share control, cash ﬂows, or both.
1. Principal Conﬂict Costs. — Principal conﬂict costs result from
investor self-seeking conduct attributable to the separation of ownership
and control. While they can arise even when a business relationship has
just one principal (along with one or more agents), they are more likely
to be a signiﬁcant problem when a ﬁrm has multiple principals with
conﬂicting interests.
Scholars have described several sources of conflict among share-
holders, including differing investment horizons112 and needs for cash
payouts,113 empty voting,114 and competing outside interests.115 Addition-
ally, when principals form a group, conﬂict costs arise from collective-
action problems such as holdouts,116 rational apathy,117 rational reticence,118
and strategic voting,119 all of which are caused by the division of control
rights among multiple parties.
111. But see Robert Louis Stevenson, Strange Case of Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde
(Canongate 1986) (1886). We assume that real-world actors do not suffer from internal
conﬂicts of the Jekyll-and-Hyde variety.
112. See José-Miguel Gaspar, Massimo Massa & Pedro Matos, Shareholder Investment
Horizons and the Market for Corporate Control, 76 J. Fin. Econ. 135, 138 (2005) (noting
that “it does make a difference who the shareholders are” because “managers face a trade-
off between targeting acquiescent short-term shareholders who are not committed to the
company and targeting demanding long-term shareholders who can give them a strong
hand at a merger negotiation table”).
113. See Deborah J. Lucas & Robert L. McDonald, Shareholder Heterogeneity,
Adverse Selection, and Payout Policy, 33 J. Fin. & Quantitative Analysis 233, 240–41 (1998)
(illustrating the “nature of possible conﬂicts among shareholder clienteles about the
ﬁrm’s dividend/repurchase policy”).
114. Henry T.C. Hu & Bernard Black, The New Vote Buying: Empty Voting and
Hidden (Morphable) Ownership, 79 S. Cal. L. Rev. 811, 816–17, 894 (2006) (discussing
the consequences of decisionmaking when separating voting rights from equity ownership).
115. See, e.g., Bainbridge, Shareholder Disempowerment, supra note 33, at 1745 n.54
(explaining that shareholder interests are “insufficiently homogenous to allow the use of
shareholder-centered, consensus-based forms of corporate decisionmaking”).
116. See Zohar Goshen, Controlling Strategic Voting: Property Rule or Liability Rule?,
70 S. Cal. L. Rev. 741, 753–56 (1997).
117. See Adolf A. Berle Jr. & Gardiner C. Means, The Modern Corporation and Private
Property 86–87 (1932) (describing minority shareholders’ lack of inﬂuence in dispersed
ownership situations, which causes them to abstain from voting or assign their vote to a
proxy); Bainbridge, Shareholder Disempowerment, supra note 33, at 1745.
118. See Gilson & Gordon, supra note 60, at 889–95 (addressing the reasons that
“[m]utual funds and other for-proﬁt investment managers are almost uniformly reticent”).
119. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Toward Undistorted Choice and Equal Treatment in
Corporate Takeovers, 98 Harv. L. Rev. 1693, 1720–23 (1985) [hereinafter Bebchuk,
Undistorted Choice] (describing shareholders’ considerations in making a tender deci-
sion); Jeffrey N. Gordon, Ties that Bond: Dual Class Common Stock and the Problem of
Shareholder Choice, 76 Calif. L. Rev. 3, 47–55 (1988) (“[A]pproval of a recapitalization
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To obviate principal conﬂict costs, investors often transfer control to
a common agent.120 As an illustration, suppose that a group of investors
hires Peggy to manage the group’s investments and that Peggy identiﬁes
an investment project that would tie up the investors’ capital for several
years but ultimately generate a superior return. It is in the investors’
collective interest that Peggy pursue the project.121 However, suppose
further that, one year into the project, Mark needs an immediate cash
distribution. If Mark could force such a payout, and the fund must
therefore liquidate the long-term project prematurely, he will impose a
loss on the other investors. Such a loss would constitute a principal
conﬂict cost. Anticipating this possibility, the investors might collectively
agree to waive their liquidation rights for ﬁxed periods.122 But by waiving
this control right, they would lose a device for holding Peggy accountable.
The goal of reducing both principal conﬂict costs and principal
competence costs similarly explains why investors in public corporations
delegate control to managers. To see this, imagine a widely held public
corporation called Direct Democracy Company. Per its charter, any of its
thousands of constantly changing shareholders may, at any time, use its
website to propose a change in its business strategy. Once a proposal
appears, holders of a simple majority of shares can approve it by online
voting.123 The corporation has managers, but their only task is to imple-
can be driven by strategic considerations that distort shareholder choice rather than by a
collective judgment that approval is optimal for public shareholders.”).
120. See generally Kenneth J. Arrow, The Limits of Organizations 69–70 (1974)
(noting that when a group of principals has conﬂicting interests, the principals prefer that
decisions be made through delegation rather than by consensus).
121. See generally Richard Brealey et al., Principles of Corporate Finance 105–09
(11th ed. 2014) (explaining the concept of net present value).
122. Indeed, this is the common structure of private equity funds. See Kaplan &
Stromberg, supra note 77, at 123. For the historical development of the capital lock-in fea-
ture in corporations, see Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci et al., The Emergence of the Corporate
Form 4–20 (Amsterdam Ctr. for Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 2013-02, 2013),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2223905 (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review).
123. The Delaware General Corporation Law authorizes this type of governance struc-
ture for corporations, permitting the certiﬁcate of incorporation to provide for manage-
ment directly by shareholders rather than the board. See Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 141(a)
(2016) (vesting management of the corporation’s “business and affairs” in the board “except
as may be otherwise provided . . . in the certiﬁcate of incorporation” and further allowing
management authority to be vested in “such person or persons as may be provided in the
certiﬁcate of incorporation”). For closely held corporations, Delaware law explicitly autho-
rizes shareholder management, although it suggests various additional requirements. Id.
at § 351. Some forms of business organization, such as the partnership and limited liability
company, provide for management by partners or members as a default rule. See, e.g., Unif.
P’ship Act § 401(h) (Nat’l Conference of Comm’rs on Unif. State Laws 2013) (“Each partner
has equal rights in the management and conduct of the partnership’s business.”); Unif.
Ltd. Liab. Co. Act §§ 407(a)–(b) (Nat’l Conference of Comm’rs on Unif. State Laws 2013)
(providing that a limited liability company is “member-managed” by default and vesting
“management and conduct” of member-managed companies in the members).
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ment business plans that the shareholders endorse. Circumscribing the
managers’ discretion in this way would undoubtedly limit agent costs. But
how likely is it that Direct Democracy Company would succeed? Because
its shares are widely held, its shareholders would have dispersed views,
conflicting interests, and differing investment horizons.124 They also would
face collective-action and coordination problems because most sharehol-
ders would own only a small fraction of the corporation, which each share-
holder would view in the context of a diversiﬁed portfolio.125 Further, the
shareholders would not be privy to most of the relevant information pos-
sessed by the ﬁrm’s managers, as posting all inside information on the
company’s website would compromise the firm’s competitive position. Un-
der such conditions, the two sources of principal costs—competence costs
and conflict costs—would most likely consume all of the firm’s potential
value. It is thus unsurprising that widely held firms never adopt this gover-
nance structure. Rather, structures that give equity investors direct control
over strategic decisions are found only in sole proprietorships, small part-
nerships, and some closely held corporations.126 State law recognizes the
costs of direct democracy in business corporations by vesting management
of a corporation’s business and affairs in the board of directors,127 and
federal law follows suit by permitting public ﬁrms to exclude from annual
proxy statements shareholder proposals related to the company’s ordinary
business operations, even if the proposals are framed in precatory terms.128
2. Agent Conﬂict Costs. — Agent conﬂict costs—which are what Jensen
and Meckling, in disregard of competence costs, simply called agency
124. See supra notes 112–115 and accompanying text.
125. Diversiﬁed investors who hold a small fraction of the equity of numerous compa-
nies are rationally apathetic about management decisions. While the rise of institutional
investors, which hold large positions in many companies and are devoted to overseeing
their investments, might suggest a decline in apathy, these investors have proven to be reti-
cent to interfere with management. See Gilson & Gordon, supra note 60, at 889–95 (ex-
plaining how institutional investors such as mutual funds and public funds undervalue their
voting rights because of a divergence between their interest in relative firm performance and
shareholders’ interest in absolute performance); see also Kahan & Rock, Hedge Funds,
supra note 60, at 1057–62 (citing low pay and incentives, political constraints, and conﬂicts
of interest as factors that keep public funds from pursuing aggressive activist strategies).
126. See, e.g., Robert W. Hillman, Power Shared and Power Denied: A Look at
Participatory Rights in the Management of General Partnerships, 1984 U. Ill. L. Rev. 865, 865–
66 (discussing the participatory rights of partners); Venky Nagar, Kathy Petroni & Daniel
Wolfenzon, Governance Problems in Closely Held Corporations, 46 J. Fin. Quantitative Analysis
943, 943–47 (2011) (measuring the effects of shareholder participation in closely held firms).
127. Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 141(a); cf. Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The
Means and Ends of Corporate Governance, 97 Nw. U. L. Rev. 547, 557–59 (2002) (positing
that centralized decisionmaking is a response to collective-action problems).
128. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(i)(7) (2016); see also Reilly S. Steel, Note, The Underground
Ruliﬁcation of the Ordinary Business Operations Exclusion, 116 Colum. L. Rev. 1547,
1558–59 (2016) (arguing that the ordinary-business-operations exclusion tracks the dis-
tinction under state law between the roles of shareholders and managers).
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costs129—are byproducts of principal costs: They arise when investors, in
order to reduce principal costs, delegate control. Corporate law scholars
have identified a wide variety of behaviors that are sources of agent conflict
costs, including entrenchment,130 merging for size,131 merging for diver-
sification,132 excessive or inefficient pay,133 self-dealing,134 tunneling,135 and
options backdating.136 All such actions are forms of shirking or diverting,
and all occur when managers do not own the rights to all of their ﬁrms’
cash ﬂows and thus do not bear the full costs of their decisions when they
exercise control.
3. A Firm’s Total Conﬂict Costs. — What causes some ﬁrms to incur
greater conﬂict costs than others? The expected magnitude of self-seek-
ing conduct by investors and managers—and thus the expected conﬂict
costs—depends on these parties’ incentives, opportunities, and procli-
vities. As Jensen and Meckling demonstrated, incentives depend on the
allocation of cash-ﬂow rights: The temptation to shirk and divert rises as
one’s share of cash ﬂows falls.137 A party’s opportunity to misbehave, in
turn, depends on the allocation of control rights,138 the type of ﬁrm,139
129. See Jensen & Meckling, supra note 1, at 308–10.
130. See Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, Management Entrenchment: The Case
of Manager-Speciﬁc Investments, 25 J. Fin. Econ. 123, 123–24 (1989) (discussing how
managers “counter disciplinary forces by entrenching themselves”).
131. See William J. Baumol, On the Theory of Expansion of the Firm, 52 Am. Econ.
Rev. 1078, 1078 (1962) (noting “management’s occupation with growth”).
132. See Yakov Amihud & Baruch Lev, Risk Reduction as a Managerial Motive for
Conglomerate Mergers, 12 Bell J. Econ. 605, 615–16 (1981) (analyzing diversiﬁcation as an
explanation for conglomerate mergers).
133. See Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 55, at 88–89 (weighing the costs to shareholders
when managers inﬂuence their own pay).
134. See Austin W. Scott, The Fiduciary Principle, 37 Calif. L. Rev. 539, 544–45 (1949)
(discussing breaches of ﬁduciary duties in self-dealing transactions).
135. See Vladimir Atanasov, Bernard Black & Conrad S. Ciccotello, Unbundling and
Measuring Tunneling, 2014 U. Ill. L. Rev. 1697, 1698–99 (examining four types of
tunneling and evaluating their effects on ﬁrm performance).
136. See Erik Lie, On the Timing of CEO Stock Option Awards, 51 Mgmt. Sci. 802,
803–04 (2005).
137. See Jensen & Meckling, supra note 1, at 314.
138. The scope of authority, the bonding and monitoring methods employed, and
other devices for curtailing control can limit the agent’s ability to get away with shirking or
diverting, but, at the same time, they will decrease the agent’s ability to manage efficiently.
See, e.g., Ricardo Alonso & Niko Matouschek, Optimal Delegation, 75 Rev. Econ. Stud.
259, 263–67 (2008) (offering a formal model of the delegation dilemma—delegating more
control rights to an agent results in higher agent costs yet higher performance, while dele-
gating fewer control rights to an agent results in lower agent costs yet lower performance).
139. For instance, ﬁrms that are “cash cows” offer many opportunities to divert tangi-
ble assets, whereas growth ﬁrms that own mostly intellectual property offer fewer opportu-
nities to divert assets. See, e.g., Michael C. Jensen, Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate
Finance, and Takeovers, 76 Am. Econ. Rev. 323, 323 (1986) (“Conﬂicts of interest between
shareholders and managers over payout policies are especially severe when the organi-
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and the intensity of market competition.140 Finally, proclivities matter:
Some people are naturally more honest than others or derive less plea-
sure from taking time off or ﬂying in a private jet. Given that all of these
factors affect the probability and magnitude of self-seeking behavior, the
expected sum of conﬂict costs is ﬁrm-speciﬁc. For example, conﬂict costs
will be relatively high in a ﬁrm in a noncompetitive industry in which
investors have delegated most of the control rights, but only a small frac-
tion of the cash-ﬂow rights, to a manager who is dishonest and lazy.
Opportunities to deter misconduct through monitoring and bonding,
which are also sources of conﬂict costs, will be ﬁrm-speciﬁc as well.141
C. Synthesis: The Control-Cost Matrix
TABLE 1
Competence Costs Conﬂict Costs
Principal
- Lack of expertise
- Inadequate information
- Lack of intelligence












- Lack of expertise
- Inadequate information
- Lack of intelligence
- Poor emotional control
- Overconﬁdence bias
- Optimism bias




- Merging for size
- Merging for diversiﬁcation
- Excessive or inefficient pay
zation generates substantial free cash ﬂow. The problem is how to motivate managers to
disgorge the cash rather than investing it at below the cost of capital or wasting it on
organization inefficiencies.”).
140. As a general principle, a monopolistic ﬁrm can survive higher levels of conﬂict
costs than can a ﬁrm in a competitive market. See, e.g., Julia Chou et al., Product Market
Competition and Corporate Governance, 1 Rev. Dev. Fin. 114, 115–16 (2011) (ﬁnding that
“corporate governance quality has a signiﬁcant effect on performance only when competi-
tion is weak” and concluding that “fear of liquidation compels managers to put forth their
best efforts for their ﬁrms”); Maria Guadalupe & Francisco Pérez-González, Competition
and Private Beneﬁts of Control 26 (Mar. 2010) (unpublished manuscript), http://
ssrn.com/abstract=890814 (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review) (ﬁnding that product-
market competition “signiﬁcantly and consistently affects . . . estimates for the value of
being in control”).
141. As the level of misconduct depends on the personal characteristics of the actor,
the type of ﬁrm, and the level of market competition, so do efforts to reduce misconduct.
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The table lists speciﬁc sources of each of the four types of control
costs. When a sole proprietor delegates no control to managers, the only
potential control costs are principal competence costs (at top left in the
table). When investors form a group, such as in a partnership, principal
conﬂict costs (at top right in the table) are also possible. If those
investors instead delegate all control rights to a manager, such as in a
foundation or trust,142 principal costs are avoided, but agent competence
costs and agent conﬂict costs (the two bottom cells in the table) become
possible. Finally, when investors share control with managers, as in most
business corporations, the exercise of control can generate all four types
of control costs.
III. THE THEORY OF PRINCIPAL COSTS
Because control costs decrease ﬁrm value, and the allocation of
control rights determines the level of control costs, the parties who share
a ﬁrm’s cash ﬂows have a collective interest in selecting a governance
structure that minimizes total control costs: the sum of principal compe-
tence costs, principal conﬂict costs, agent competence costs, and agent
conﬂict costs. We therefore can presume that, absent a market failure or
prohibitive transaction costs,143 each ﬁrm has a governance structure that
suits its ﬁrm-speciﬁc characteristics.
A. The Tradeoff Between Principal Costs and Agent Costs
The allocation of control rights in a ﬁrm is a zero-sum proposition.
Any reallocation of control rights reduces the power of some parties
while increasing the power of others. Consider, for example, control over
the ﬁrm’s business plan. Business planning can be divided into three
components: proposing the plan, adopting it, and implementing it.
Investors could retain control over all three components, or they could
142. See, e.g., Henry Hansmann & Steen Thomsen, Managerial Distance and Virtual
Ownership: The Governance of Industrial Foundations 5–6 (European Corp. Governance
Inst., Working Paper No. 372, 2013), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2246116 (on ﬁle with the
Columbia Law Review) (describing and analyzing industrial foundations’ performance and
functions).
143. See Victor Brudney, Corporate Governance, Agency Costs, and the Rhetoric of
Contract, 85 Colum. L. Rev. 1403, 1404–05 (1985) (noting that, under conventional
assumptions, performance of a contract will make all parties better off unless there is a
market failure); R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & Econ. 1, 15–19 (1960)
(discussing the effect of transaction costs); Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The
End of History for Corporate Law, 89 Geo. L.J. 439, 467 (2001) [hereinafter Hansmann &
Kraakman, End of History] (mentioning market failure as a possible cause of mana-
gerialism); Michael Klausner, Corporations, Corporate Law, and Networks of Contracts, 81
Va. L. Rev. 757, 769–70 (1995) (describing different types of market failure).
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delegate responsibility for one or more components to managers. More-
over, if they delegate control to managers, they could retain the right to
select the managers themselves. Alternatively, they could delegate that
right too, making management self-perpetuating. What investors cannot
do, however, is retain full and ﬁnal authority over particular decisions
while simultaneously delegating full and ﬁnal authority over those
decisions to managers.
While the division of control rights in a ﬁrm is zero-sum, the impact
of that division on control costs is not. Some divisions are more efficient
than others. We can conceptualize various divisions of control along a
range that begins with 100% control for investors and ends with 100%
control for managers. As investors delegate along this spectrum, trans-
ferring more control to managers, principal costs fall but agent costs rise;
shifting control from managers to investors has the opposite effect. But
the impact of such movements on principal costs and agent costs need
not fully offset: Shifting control from investors to managers might decrease
principal costs more than it increases agent costs. In theory, there is a
point along the control spectrum at which the sum of principal and agent
costs is at a minimum—a point achieved by a particular governance struc-
ture that varies across ﬁrms.
As an illustration, imagine a ﬁrm in which investors hold 100% of
the control rights and are deciding whether to delegate 1% of those
rights to managers. Delegation would decrease expected principal costs
—assume by $100. And it would increase expected agent costs, but per-
haps not by as much—assume by $50. Therefore, delegation of 1% of the
control rights would increase firm value by $50. It follows that the investors
will favor the delegation: As holders of the cash-ﬂow rights, they capture
the increase in ﬁrm value that the delegation achieves.
It is possible that delegation in some ﬁrms continues to be efficient
across the entire delegation range.144 In those ﬁrms, we can expect inves-
tors to delegate all control rights to managers, as the sum of principal
costs and agent costs reaches its nadir when the managers have full
control. Such ﬁrms would achieve their maximum value by selecting a
governance structure, such as the dual-class share structure, that assigns a
high degree of control to managers.145
At the opposite extreme are ﬁrms in which delegation increases total
control costs throughout the delegation range. In such ﬁrms, any incre-
144. For instance, we can expect such a tradeoff in ﬁrms with complex technologies
(such as Google, Facebook, and LinkedIn) or with complex and unique business strategies
(such as Berkshire Hathaway). In these ﬁrms, principal costs are expected to be very high.
145. See Goshen & Hamdani, supra note 13, at 590–91 (explaining the potential bene-
ﬁts of the dual-class share structure for ﬁrms in which managerial “idiosyncratic vision” is
important).
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mental transfer of control to managers increases expected agent costs
more than it reduces expected principal costs. Such ﬁrms minimize
control costs by placing all control in the hands of investors. If they were
public companies, they would adopt governance structures resembling
direct democracy.146 Because public companies never actually adopt such
structures, we can be confident that firms large enough to go public never
have such a relationship between principal and agent costs. Instead, this
relationship seems to exist exclusively in smaller ﬁrms such as sole
proprietorships, as well as partnerships in which the partners retain full
control over business decisions.147
Finally, there are many ﬁrms in which delegation is initially cost
effective but eventually becomes inefficient as more control is shifted to
managers. These firms maximize value by adopting governance structures
that delegate a large measure of control to managers but also empower
the investors to hold the managers accountable. One such structure is
the corporation with dispersed ownership.148
B. Delegation and Accountability Rights
While control structures differ in terms of the degree of delegation,
they also differ in the form that delegation takes.149 In particular, struc-
tures vary in terms of the types of control rights that investors retain in
order to hold managers accountable in their exercise of delegated control.
There are many types of retained accountability rights; we limit ourselves
here to identifying some of the most prominent examples and discussing
their relationship to the distinction between competence costs and con-
ﬂict costs.
Retained accountability rights can usefully be divided into two gene-
ral categories: duty-enforcement rights and discretionary rights. Duty-
enforcement rights permit a principal to sue an agent for breach of a
restriction on the agent’s exercise of control. The source of the restriction
could be a statute (such as a general incorporation law150), a contract
146. See supra notes 123–128 and accompanying text.
147. See, e.g., Royston Greenwood & Laura Empson, The Professional Partnership:
Relic or Exemplary Form of Governance?, 24 Org. Stud. 909, 916–17 (2003) (explaining
the success of partnerships of professionals).
148. See Goshen & Hamdani, supra note 13, at 589.
149. Delegation can occur along multiple dimensions. One dimension is temporal:
Investors might give a measure of control to managers only for a ﬁxed term. Delegation
can also depend on the type of decision: Investors might entrust managers with day-to-day
operations but not strategic planning. In addition, investors can retain the power to select
only some managers, such as a corporation’s directors, while allowing those managers to
select the subagents, such as the CEO and other officers.
150. See, e.g., Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 141 (2016).
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(such as a bond indenture with covenants151), or the common law (such
as the law of ﬁduciary duties,152 which requires agents to disclose conﬂicts
of interest, refrain from self-dealing, and make decisions on an informed
basis153). In addition, the restriction can take the form of a standard, such
as the duty to act in good faith,154 or a rule, such as a covenant that speci-
ﬁes a ﬁrm’s maximum leverage ratio.155
Regardless of the form that a duty-enforcement right takes, the
process for the right’s creation and enforcement is the same: First, a
restriction on the agent’s exercise of control is established; second, the
agent violates the restriction; third, the principal sues for relief. Although
principals have discretion over whether to seek relief, they do not have
discretion over whether to grant relief: That discretion is vested in a court,
which decides whether the agent violated the applicable rule or standard.
The primary function of duty-enforcement rights is to reduce con-
ﬂict costs.156 Such rights are not normally used to reduce competence
costs, as it is difficult to prove to a judge that a ﬁrm’s underperformance
resulted from unwise managerial decisions rather than bad luck.157 The
deferential business judgment rule reﬂects judicial reluctance to evaluate
managerial competence, as contrasted with managerial loyalty.158
151. See Clifford W. Smith, Jr. & Jerold B. Warner, On Financial Contracting: An
Analysis of Bond Covenants, 7 J. Fin. Econ. 117, 151 (1979) (“The debt contract typically
gives the ﬁrm a strong incentive to live up to the restrictive covenants: any breach of the
covenants is considered an act of default.”).
152. See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 808 (Del. 1984) (holding that pre-suit
demand on the board in the context of a derivative suit is “excused where facts are alleged
with particularity which create a reasonable doubt that the directors’ action was entitled to
the protections of the business judgment rule”).
153. These duties are, of course, the basis for corporate law’s duties of loyalty and care.
See, e.g., William T. Allen, Jack B. Jacobs & Leo E. Strine, Jr., Function over Form: A
Reassessment of Standards of Review in Delaware Corporation Law, 56 Bus. Law. 1287,
1290–91 (2001).
154. See In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 62–68 (Del. 2006).
155. See Smith & Warner, supra note 151, at 131–35 (describing and modeling bond
covenants that “indirectly restrict production/investment policy”).
156. These are the rights that Jensen and Meckling probably had in mind when they
discussed how the investor in their model might bargain for monitoring rights to reduce
the direct costs of agent misconduct. See supra text accompanying note 50. Thus, prohi-
bitions on self-dealing are meant to deter diverting, and requirements that agents act only
in a well-informed manner (the traditional duty of care) aim to deter shirking.
157. William T. Allen, Jack B. Jacobs & Leo E. Strine, Jr., Realigning the Standard of
Review of Director Due Care with Delaware Public Policy: A Critique of Van Gorkom and Its
Progeny as a Standard of Review Problem, 96 Nw. U. L. Rev. 449, 454–55 (2002) (ex-
plaining the difficulty of enforcing the duty of care).
158. The business judgment rule provides that disinterested and well-informed corpo-
rate directors are not liable to the corporation for making negligent business decisions.
See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 811–13 (Del. 1984).
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The second category of retained accountability rights—discretionary
control rights—are rights that principals may exercise without first having
to prove that the agent violated an established restriction. In the enforce-
ment of such rights, there is no distinction between seeking the relief
and granting it: The principals’ exercise of discretion encompasses both.
Discretionary rights can be collective or individual. Paradigmatic examples
of collective rights include the rights of corporate shareholders to select
and replace directors159 and to vote on proposed mergers.160 Individual
discretionary rights include the investor’s right to withdraw capital from a
hedge fund or mutual fund.161
Like duty-enforcement rights, discretionary rights can reduce agent
conflict costs. But that is not their primary function. Rather, they are used
mainly to constrain agent competence costs, as duty-enforcement rights
are ill-suited to this task.162 Thus, if principals have a right to replace an
agent for incompetence, they may do so without restriction.
Unlike duty-enforcement rights, whose primary function is to miti-
gate agent conﬂict costs, discretionary rights reduce both agent conﬂict
costs and agent competence costs; they therefore have greater capacity to
curb total agent costs. But there’s a catch: They also entail higher prin-
159. See Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 141(k) (2016) (providing for the removal of directors
by majority shareholder vote). Shareholders exercise such discretionary rights when they
vote incumbent directors out of office. Notably, shareholders who wish to elect new direc-
tors need not prove in court that the old directors violated some rule or standard—that
they self-dealt, acted in bad faith, or were objectively incompetent. The shareholders can
act entirely on their own accord. Id. (authorizing shareholders to remove directors “with
or without cause”). Another example of a discretionary right is the right that most general
incorporation statutes give holders of a majority of a corporation’s shares to veto a board-
approved merger, dissolution, or sale of all assets. See id. §§ 251, 271, 275 (providing for
procedures of dissolution). Corporate charters can empower shareholders to veto other
transactions as well. See id. § 141(a). To do so, the shareholders need not establish that
the board proposed the transaction in bad faith or because of a conﬂict of interests; the
shareholders may simply decide that the transaction would not be in their best interest. Id.
Conversely, investors can waive their right to veto fundamental transactions by forming a
limited liability company (LLC). See, e.g., Revised Unif. Ltd. Liab. Co. Act § 110 (Nat’l
Conference of Comm’rs on Unif. State Laws 2013) (providing that an LLC operating
agreement may broadly alter default rules). State LLC statutes do not mandate investor
ratiﬁcation of any particular business transaction, permitting the parties to allocate this
control right as they see ﬁt. Id.
160. See, e.g., Goshen, supra note 116, at 749–51 (discussing strategic voting by share-
holders and the majority rule).
161. See John Morley, The Separation of Funds and Managers: A Theory of
Investment Fund Structure and Regulation, 123 Yale L.J. 1228, 1252–54 (2014). Each
investor can exercise this right unilaterally and purely at the investor’s discretion. The
investor need not ﬁrst prove that the fund’s managers violated an obligation or fell short
of a standard of performance.
162. The Jensen-Meckling model grants the investor no discretionary control rights
precisely because the model assumes away competence costs. The model’s manager can
act disloyally, but he never makes honest mistakes. See supra section I.B.
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cipal costs. For example, corporate shareholders with the discretionary
power to veto mergers proposed by directors could make honest mistakes
that reduce ﬁrm value. And a subgroup of shareholders could use the
discretionary veto power to extract value from other shareholders by
holding out.163 Duty-enforcement rights, by contrast, are less disruptive of
business operations, entailing lower principal costs.164 Accordingly, they
are less effective at reining in agent costs.
As with the overall delegation question—implicating the tradeoff
between principal costs and agent costs—the right tradeoff between dis-
cretionary rights and duty-enforcement rights is ﬁrm-speciﬁc. The parties
who structure a ﬁrm, and who will either receive its cash ﬂows or sell
them to others, maximize their wealth when they select the ﬁrm-speciﬁc
allocation of control rights that minimizes total control costs.
C. Understanding the Governance Spectrum
Agency-cost essentialism can explain neither of the dimensions
along which governance structures vary: the degree to which they dele-
gate control to managers, and the degree to which they enable investors
to hold managers accountable for the exercise of that control.165 For
example, essentialism cannot explain why, even in wholly-owned ﬁrms,
investors delegate authority to managers, as doing so creates agent
conﬂict costs, the bête noir of the essentialists. Nor can it explain why
investors would ever agree to tie their hands, limiting their power to hold
managers accountable. Principal-cost theory can explain both.
163. See, e.g., Schreiber v. Carney, 447 A.2d 17, 25–26 (Del. Ch. 1982) (holding that a
corporation’s loan to a shareholder made conditional on its vote in favor of a pending
merger was not per se illegal).
164. The potential for a duty-enforcement right to disrupt depends on whether it may
be exercised only periodically or instead at any time. For example, a mandatory-dividend
requirement, which is periodic in nature, does not interfere with managers’ power to
select and implement the ﬁrm’s business strategy. It merely limits the managers’ control
over proﬁts, enabling investors to decide whether to reinvest them with the managers or
deploy them elsewhere. Mandatory dividends are often found in master limited partner-
ships, see, e.g., Matthew J. McCabe, Comment, Master Limited Partnerships’ Cost of Capital
Conundrum, 17 U. Pa. J. Bus. L. 319, 327 (2014), and in real estate investment trusts, see
William Hardin III & Matthew D. Hill, REIT Dividend Determinants: Excess Dividends and
Capital Markets, 36 Real Est. Econ. 349, 351 (2008).
Similarly, ﬁxed-term investments give managers unfettered discretion until the term
ends, when investors can decide whether to extend the managers’ control over the funds.
See Morley, supra note 161, at 1254–55 (discussing private equity fund exit rights). Bond
covenants, by contrast, often set continuous limits on managers’ power to shape a ﬁrm’s
capital structure and operations, such as by restricting the issuance of new debt or
prohibiting changes in the ﬁrm’s line of business. See Smith & Warner, supra note 151, at
124–25.
165. Cf. Arrow, supra note 120, at 79 (“Clearly, there is no consensus on the need for
responsibility and certainly not on its scope or on the mechanisms for its achievement.”).
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Under the principal-costs model, investors delegate control to mana-
gers to reduce the competence costs, and sometimes the conﬂict costs,
that they would generate if they ran the firm entirely themselves. For
example, a highly competent businessperson who owns multiple busi-
nesses might hire managers to run some of those businesses if the
opportunity costs that the owner would have to incur to avoid mistakes in
running those businesses is higher than the opportunity costs that the
managers incur. In this way, a model of ﬁrm governance that includes
principal competence costs can incorporate the economic theory of
comparative advantage.
Principal costs also explain why investors often agree to restrictions
on their powers to hold managers accountable. A common such restric-
tion is on the power to ﬁre managers.166 Shareholders in business corpo-
rations consent to a structure that permits them to replace directors only
once per year, absent extraordinary circumstances.167 Agent-cost theory
suggests that shareholders should want the power to replace directors at
any point. But once principal costs are also taken into account, at-will
director employment is no longer a self-evident ideal.
Understanding why shareholders would voluntarily tie their own
hands starts with the observation that the appearance of suboptimal per-
formance by a business ﬁrm can have a variety of causes, not all of which
call for replacing managers. One potential cause is self-seeking mana-
gerial conduct (shirking and diverting) that generates agent conﬂict
costs.168 A second is imperfections in the performance measurement,
such as short-term market mispricing of publicly traded shares.169 A third
possibility is bad luck.170 Finally, suboptimal performance might be due
to a pattern of honest managerial mistakes, reﬂecting agent incompe-
tence. Only the last of these possibilities provides clear grounds for ﬁring
managers. If the managers are self-seeking but otherwise competent, the
optimal solution might be more monitoring and better pay-based
incentives. Imperfect performance measurements, in turn, call for better
instruments, while bad luck calls simply for patience. If investors always
diagnosed the cause of underperformance accurately, and reliably acted
166. See Bebchuk, Insulating Boards, supra note 62, at 1679–81 (explaining the costs
associated with board insulation).
167. See id. at 1654–56; cf. Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 141(k) (2016) (providing that
shareholders may remove members of classiﬁed boards only for cause unless the charter
provides otherwise).
168. See supra section II.B.2.
169. See Aydoğan Alti & Paul C. Tetlock, Biased Beliefs, Asset Prices, and Investment:
A Structural Approach, 69 J. Fin. 325, 326 (2014) (identifying overconﬁdence and over-
extrapolation as performance-based causes of mispricing by shareholders).
170. In any particular context, even the shrewdest business strategy will have some
probability of failure.
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prudently and honestly, there would be no reason for them to agree to
limit or waive their power to ﬁre managers. But most investors do not ﬁt
this description. Most investors could misattribute disloyalty, bad mea-
surements, or bad luck to incompetence, and then generate principal
costs by ﬁring a competent manager.
When investors confront the question whether to replace the mana-
gers of an underperforming ﬁrm, a complicating factor is that the
managers often know more than the investors about why the ﬁrm is fal-
tering. The managers will know if they acted disloyally, and they will have
a good sense of whether the performance measurement is accurate.
Because, however, managers might be dishonest, investors might distrust
the explanations they offer. Therefore, investors will rationally expect
managers to overattribute poor performance to distorted measurements
and bad luck, and underattribute it to incompetence and disloyalty.
However, in second-guessing managers, investors will sometimes make
honest mistakes: They will sometimes misdiagnose the cause of underper-
formance and replace managers who are, despite the ﬁrm’s poor perfor-
mance, in fact loyal and competent. Notably, the converse problem can
also arise: Incompetent investors might fail to ﬁre incompetent managers
because good luck or a distorted performance measure makes the mana-
gers seem more competent than they really are.
Anticipating the risk of false negatives—of being ﬁred despite their
competence—managers could respond in a variety of ways. They could
demand a higher salary as compensation for the risk. They also could
avoid proﬁtable but complex business strategies that are prone to mis-
measurement.171 In Mark and Peggy’s hypothetical principal–agent rela-
tionship, Peggy might refrain from picking undervalued stocks that will
take time to appreciate in value, instead investing Mark’s capital in stocks
that follow the market or whose value can be easily explained. Finally,
managers might simply refuse to work for investors whom they suspect
are incompetent. None of these anticipatory responses by managers are
good for investors, as all force investors to internalize the expected costs
of their mistakes.
This discussion suggests that investors and managers have a common
interest in selecting a governance structure that minimizes the expected
sum of principal costs and agent costs. And this optimal structure might
include an agreement by the investors to tie their own hands.172 For
171. See, e.g., Mustafa Ciftci, Do Analysts Underestimate Future Beneﬁts of R&D?, 5
Int’l Bus. Res., Sept. 2012, at 26, 35 (ﬁnding “analysts underestimate earnings long term
growth for [research-and-development]-intensive ﬁrms”).
172. Jack Jacobs, former Justice of the Delaware Supreme Court, has suggested that
state incorporation statutes should be amended to allow ﬁrms to replace annual director
elections with elections every three or ﬁve years. Jack B. Jacobs, “Patient Capital”: Can
Delaware Corporate Law Help Revive It?, 68 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1645, 1660–61 (2011).
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example, the investors might agree to give managers a long period
during which they cannot be ﬁred without cause, emboldening the
managers to pursue proﬁtable long-term projects that are subject to
short-term mismeasurement.173
A desire to avoid principal conﬂict costs is a second reason why in-
vestors might accede to limits on their power to replace managers. For
example, Peggy might refuse to work for Mark, despite an offer of 50% of
the returns from the portfolio while she manages it, if she fears that Mark,
in order to capture 100% of the continuing earnings for himself, will
opportunistically ﬁre her after she selects a high-value portfolio. Mark
might then ﬁnd it beneﬁcial to guarantee Peggy employment for a mini-
mum period. In essence, Mark would be bonding himself to Peggy with
the expectation that the bonding cost is less than the other principal
conﬂict costs thereby avoided. Similarly, in a ﬁrm with multiple investors,
conﬂicts between investors with short horizons and those with long hori-
zons would generate principal conﬂict costs. Such costs would arise if the
short-termers pressured management to run the ﬁrm in a way that tem-
porarily boosted its stock prices but reduced its long-term value.174 By
173. In some ﬁrms, the investors may require some form of compensation for this
voluntary surrender of power. But even when this is true, a mutually agreeable bargain will
be possible as long as the value to managers of noninterference exceeds the value that the
investors place on the power to interfere. Such a bargain will be possible if, for example,
managers believe that they are more competent or loyal than the investors perceive them
to be.
174. Scholars and other commentators have debated whether, and to what extent, this
conﬂict exists in public corporations. The contestants in the debate present both theo-
retical models and empirical evidence. For arguments criticizing the claim that increased
shareholder control elevates the pursuit of short-term value at the expense of long-term
value, see Bebchuk et al., Long-Term, supra note 62, at 1088–89 (concluding an empirical
study does not support the “myopic-activist” claim); Bebchuk, Insulating Boards, supra
note 62, at 1644 (rejecting the short-termism claim that insulating boards serves long-term
value and arguing that shareholders’ ability to intervene and engage creates long-term
value); cf. Roe, supra note 60, at 1005 (ﬁnding no support for claims that short-term
trading undermines corporate decisionmaking and concluding that “the evidence that
ﬁnancial markets are excessively short-term is widely believed but not proven”).
For arguments that advocate the opposite position—that short-term goals threaten
long-term stability—see Martin Lipton, Bite the Apple; Poison the Apple; Paralyze the
Company; Wreck the Economy, Harv. L. Sch. Forum on Corp. Governance & Fin. Reg.
(Feb. 26, 2013), http://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2013/02/26/bite-the-apple-poison-the-
apple-paralyze-the-company-wreck-the-economy/ [http://perma.cc/KSW2-9AR4] (critiquing
Professor Lucian Bebchuk’s empirical work and warning of “self-seeking activists” and
academics who promote “shareholder democracy” at the expense of long-term company
value); see also Brian J. Bushee, Do Institutional Investors Prefer Near-Term Earnings over
Long-Run Value?, 18 Contemp. Acct. Res. 207, 213 (2001) (ﬁnding that high levels of
transient ownership are associated with overweighting of near-term expected earnings and
underweighting of long-term expected earnings); cf. Adam Brandenburger & Ben Polak,
When Managers Cover Their Posteriors: Making the Decisions the Market Wants to See, 27
RAND J. Econ. 523, 526–27, 537 (1996) (explaining myopia as a function of information
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restricting the investors’ ability to replace managers except after long
intervals, or by eliminating that right altogether, the investors could
reduce such conﬂict costs.
In a division of control negotiated between investors and managers,
expected principal costs and agent costs will determine whether, and at
what intervals, the investors have the power to replace the managers.
Shorter intervals—the extreme form of which is employment at will—
correspond to lower expected agent costs but higher expected principal
costs; longer intervals—the extreme form of which is lifetime employ-
ment—have the converse implications. In this way, principal-cost theory
explains why real ﬁrms adopt a range of governance structures that differ
in (among other structural elements) the frequency with which they
allow investors to replace managers.
D. Structures Along the Spectrum
The different degrees of control that investors can exercise over
managers produce a spectrum of governance structures. The investor-
controlled “direct democracy” sits at one pole, while the manager-
controlled corporation with dual-class shares sits at the other.175 The
dispersed-ownership structure, the most common arrangement among
American public companies, falls in the middle. The following discussion
considers three of the most important governance structures that public
ﬁrms adopt—the dual-class share structure, the concentrated-ownership
structure, and the dispersed-ownership structure—and assesses the
tradeoff between principal costs and agent costs struck by each.176 Other
asymmetries between managers and shareholders and concluding that managers focused
on maximization of share price are less efficient than those concerned with maximization
of expected proﬁts); Jeremy C. Stein, Efficient Capital Markets, Inefficient Firms: A Model
of Myopic Corporate Behavior, 104 Q.J. Econ. 655, 655–56, 668 (1989) (presenting a
game-theoretic model suggesting that markets in which investors prefer short-term
projects induce managers to pursue myopic short-term projects).
The empirical debate does not yet have a clear winner. See John C. Coffee, Jr. &
Darius Palia, The Wolf at the Door: The Impact of Hedge Fund Activism on Corporate
Governance, 41 J. Corp. L. 545, 603–07 (2016) (reviewing various studies and concluding
that the extent of short-termism is unclear). Nevertheless, the phenomenon is at least
theoretically possible and serves as a useful illustration of how the potential for principal
costs could induce investors to tie their own hands.
175. See Goshen & Hamdani, supra note 13, at 587–88 (explaining “the spectrum of
ownership patterns”).
176. Market failure may also explain why some allocate control rights differently. For
example, managers may sometimes acquire control rights beyond what is efficient because
of informational asymmetries. See generally Joseph E. Stiglitz, Information and the
Change in the Paradigm in Economics, 92 Am. Econ. Rev. 460, 469–70 (2002). Thus,
managers might be able to convince investors that a high degree of delegation is appro-
priate by withholding critical information that would show that they are not as honest or
talented as the investors think they are.
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common governance arrangements, such as the standard private equity
fund and the traditional partnership, could be slotted at various points
along the spectrum.
1. The Dual-Class Share Structure. — In a corporation with dual-class
shares, the controllers are managers who own shares with superior voting
rights, while outside investors hold shares with inferior voting rights.177
Google and Facebook notably went public with this structure.178 The out-
side shareholders of such ﬁrms cannot interfere with business decisions
or replace the board.179 And while they can sell their shares, the outside
shareholders cannot withdraw their investments from the ﬁrm.180 For
these reasons, neither activist hedge funds nor hostile raiders can force
the managers of a dual-class ﬁrm to change their business strategy.181
In the absence of direct control mechanisms, investors in dual-class
ﬁrms discourage self-seeking managerial conduct by giving the managers
a large share of the cash ﬂows, typically about 40%.182 Still, because the
managers directly internalize less than half of the costs and beneﬁts of
177. As an illustration, imagine a ﬁrm that has Class A shares with 51% of the votes but
only 10% of the cash-ﬂow rights, and Class B shares with 49% of the votes but 90% of the
cash-ﬂow rights. The manager-agents would own the Class A shares, and the investor-
principals would own the Class B shares. See, e.g., Gordon, supra note 119, at 4.
178. See Wong, supra note 78. Google and Facebook are unusual dual-class ﬁrms in
that their managers hold only a small share of the cash-ﬂow rights. See Dan Bigman,
Facebook Ownership Structure Should Scare Investors More than Botched IPO, Forbes
(May 23, 2012, 5:40 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/danbigman/2012/05/23/facebook-
ownership-structure-should-scare-investors-more-than-botched-ipo/ (on file with the Columbia
Law Review) (noting Facebook founder Mark Zuckerberg “owns about 18% of the com-
pany, but controls more than 50% of the voting power” and Google founders Sergey Brin
and Larry Page, as of 2012, hold only 21.5% of the “economic share of the company but
exercise 73% of the voting power”); see also Steven Davidoff Solomon, New Share Class
Gives Google Tighter Control, N.Y. Times: Dealbook (Apr. 13, 2012, 9:17 AM), http://
dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/04/13/new-share-class-gives-google-founders-tighter-control/
(on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review) [hereinafter Solomon, New Share Class] (noting
that the proposed plan to issue a third class of shares would ensure Google’s founders’
continuing control while diluting their economic stake).
179. Cf. Bigman, supra note 178 (describing controlling shareholders as “bulletproof”).
180. Sales of a ﬁrm’s shares in the secondary market do not reduce the ﬁrm’s capital;
they merely shift equity from some investors to others. By contrast, the withdrawal of
capital by an investor shrinks the pool of assets under management’s control. See Henry
Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The Essential Role of Organizational Law, 110 Yale L.J.
387, 393–98 (2000).
181. But see Kobi Kastiel, Against All Odds: Hedge Fund Activism in Controlled
Companies, 2016 Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 60, 90–95 (presenting and analyzing evidence of
activist interventions in dual-class ﬁrms).
182. See, e.g., Paul A. Gompers, Joy Ishii & Andrew Metrick, Extreme Governance: An
Analysis of Dual-Class Firms in the United States, 23 Rev. Fin. Stud. 1051, 1084 (2010)
[hereinafter Gompers et al., Extreme Governance].
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their actions on the ﬁrm’s behalf, potential agent costs are high.183 On
the other hand, potential principal costs are minimal, as managers enjoy
complete freedom to pursue their strategic visions without fear that
investors will mistakenly attempt to ﬁre them for poor performance when
they are actually performing well. 184 The use of a dual-class share
structure is a good illustration of the ﬁrm-speciﬁc nature of corporate
governance, as the structure may be well-suited to ﬁrms in complex
industries such as information technology (e.g., Google,185 Facebook,186
and LinkedIn187), or to ﬁrms whose outside shareholders recognize ma-
nagement’s unique skills and strategic vision (e.g., Berkshire Hathaway188).
It is nonetheless an extreme option on the governance-structure menu,
and it is uncommon among public ﬁrms in the United States.189
2. The Concentrated-Ownership Structure. — In a firm with concentrated
ownership, a single entity (or bloc of investors) controls the corporation
by virtue of owning a large number of common shares.190 But there is no
division between control rights and cash-ﬂow rights: The controller owns
equal portions of both.191 Thus, unlike the dual-class share structure, the
concentrated-ownership structure adheres to the principle of one share,
one vote.192 Control is not contestable unless the controller holds fewer
183. See, e.g., Ronald W. Masulis, Cong Wang & Fei Xie, Agency Problems at Dual-
Class Companies, 64 J. Fin. 1697, 1698 (2009) (“[S]hareholders anticipate that corporate
cash holdings are more likely to be misused at companies where insider voting rights are
disproportionately greater than cash ﬂow rights . . . .”).
184. See, e.g., Goshen & Hamdani, supra note 13, at 591 (exploring the beneﬁts of
protecting managers’ “idiosyncratic vision”); Belén Villalonga & Raphael Amit, Family
Control of Firms and Industries, 59 Fin. Mgmt. 863, 901 (2010) (“[F]ounding families
retain control when doing so gives the ﬁrm a competitive advantage . . . . The implication
is that nonfamily shareholders in those ﬁrms are better off than they would be without
family control.”).
185. See Bigman, supra note 178.
186. See id.
187. See Steven Davidoff Solomon, A Deeper Look at LinkedIn’s Structure, N.Y.
Times: Dealbook (May 12, 2011, 4:01 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/05/12/a-
deeper-look-at-linkedins-structure/ (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review).
188. See Alistair Barr, Buffett Defends Newspapers’ Dual-Class Shares, MarketWatch
(May 5, 2007, 5:15 PM), http://www.marketwatch.com/story/buffett-defends-dual-class-
shares-for-newspapers [http://perma.cc/L5TH-KA8L].
189. See Robert Daines & Michael Klausner, Do IPO Charters Maximize Firm Value?
Antitakeover Protection in IPOs, 17 J.L. Econ. & Org. 83, 95 (2001) (ﬁnding that only 6%
of IPO ﬁrms comprising a study’s sample had dual-class shares); Gompers et al., Extreme
Governance, supra note 182, at 1057 (noting that only about 6% of publicly traded ﬁrms
in the United States have a dual-class share structure).
190. See, e.g., Goshen & Hamdani, supra note 13, at 564 n.9.
191. Id. at 591–92 (“Unlike in the dual-class structure, equity in a concentrated-
ownership structure is issued at a ratio of one share to one vote.”).
192. Id.; see also Sanford J. Grossman & Oliver D. Hart, One Share-One Vote and the
Market for Corporate Control, 20 J. Fin. Econ. 175, 177–78 (1988) (analyzing the
conditions for the optimality of the principle of one share, one vote).
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than 50% of the shares.193 The controller acts as an agent of minority
investors and can directly manage the corporation or appoint profes-
sional managers whom it can replace at will.194
When an agent’s control is incontestable, potential principal costs
are low but potential agent costs are high. The dual-class share structure
and the concentrated-ownership structure have this distribution of costs
in common. The two structures diverge, however, insofar as potential agent
costs will be lower in the concentrated-ownership structure because the
controller typically owns a larger proportion of the ﬁrm’s cash-ﬂow rights
(50% or more) than do the managers of a dual-class ﬁrm (who, as noted,
usually own about 40%).195 It is probably for this reason that the concen-
trated-ownership structure is more common.196 But the dual-class share
structure does have one relative advantage: It allows managers to sell a
larger slice of the ﬁrm’s cash ﬂows to outside investors without com-
promising their complete control.197 Therefore, if the managers wish to
retain incontestable control but have limited personal wealth, the dual-
class share structure enables them to raise more capital and thereby
achieve greater economies of scale. In this way, the choice between the
dual-class share structure and the concentrated-ownership structure will
often entail a tradeoff between economies of scale and agent costs.
3. The Dispersed-Ownership Structure. — Notably, the two governance
structures discussed so far do not enable outside investors to oust mana-
gers.198 Investors in ﬁrms with those structures can sell their interests, but
they have little “voice.”199 The right to ﬁre managers does not emerge on
the governance spectrum until we reach the dispersed-ownership structure,
193. When a controlling shareholder holds more than 50% of the shares, an acquirer
of all other shares obtains only a minority position in the ﬁrm.
194. Cf. Gilson, Complicating the Comparative Taxonomy, supra note 84, at 1652
(explaining minority shareholders’ interests will be served when beneﬁts from the control-
ling block’s monitoring of management exceed the controlling block’s private extraction
beneﬁts).
195. See supra notes 182–183, 193 and accompanying text.
196. See Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-De-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, Corporate
Ownership Around the World, 54 J. Fin. 471, 474 (1999) (ﬁnding that concentrated
ownership is the dominant structure for large companies worldwide).
197. Interestingly, sometimes even two classes of shares are insufficient to protect
control, as Google’s creation of a third class of nonvoting shares illustrates. See Tom Hals,
Google Settlement Clears Way for New Class C Stock, Reuters (June 17, 2013, 1:44 PM),
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-google-stockplan-settlement-idUSBRE95G0MU20130617
[http://perma.cc/GWK9-63MV].
198. The managers and the controlling shareholder are treated in unity as the agent
(i.e., management). See supra text accompanying note 36 (deﬁning the concept of
management broadly). Clearly, if the controlling shareholder is not also the manager, then
the controlling owner—but not the public shareholders—can replace the manager.
199. Cf. Solomon, New Share Class, supra note 178 (discussing Class A and C share-
holders at Google, who have fewer voting rights than Class B shareholders).
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the most common structure among public corporations in the United
States.200
While other governance structures may give managers full control—
either indeﬁnitely (as in a dual-class ﬁrm) or for a ﬁxed period (as in a
private equity fund)—investors can contest control of a dispersed-owner-
ship ﬁrm through their voting rights.201 The structure entrusts managers
to make the day-to-day business decisions (normally the CEO’s realm of
authority202) as well as major strategic and governance decisions (the
board’s realm of authority203). But shareholders can veto decisions by the
board to merge the ﬁrm, sell all of its assets, or dissolve it,204 and they can
alter the business plan by replacing the directors.205 The structure there-
fore entails lower potential agent costs and higher potential principal
costs than does either the dual-class share structure or the concentrated-
ownership structure.
A shareholder who wishes to change the business plan of a corpo-
ration with dispersed ownership normally follows either of two strategies.
One strategy, pursued by hostile raiders, is to assemble a control block.
Raiders begin a control contest by buying a toehold—about 10% of the
outstanding shares—on the open market.206 Then, to build that stake
into a majority of shares, they make a tender offer that offers the other
shareholders a premium over the market price.207 If the offer is success-
ful, the raider can use the voting power appurtenant to the control block
to replace the board and implement a new business plan.208 Alternatively,
the raider can decide that the incumbent managers’ business vision is
200. See, e.g., La Porta et al., supra note 196, at 471.
201. For the seminal article, see Henry G. Manne, Mergers and the Market for
Corporate Control, 73 J. Pol. Econ. 110, 112–13 (1965) (“[T]he market for corporate con-
trol gives to . . . shareholders both power and protection commensurate with their interest
in corporate affairs.”).
202. See Principles of Corp. Governance: Analysis & Recommendations § 3.01 (Am.
Law Inst. 1994) (explaining that board-appointed senior executives perform the manage-
ment duties in public companies).
203. See Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2016) (establishing expansive board authority
as the default rule); Principles of Corp. Governance: Analysis & Recommendations § 3.02.
204. See tit. 8 §§ 251, 271, 275 (requiring majority shareholder approval of board reso-
lutions to merge a corporation or sell substantially all of its assets).
205. This is the essential leverage of hedge fund activism. See, e.g., Kahan & Rock,
Hedge Funds, supra note 60, at 1029–30 (highlighting the resignation of former Star Gas
CEO due to pressure from Third Point Capital).
206. See Ronald J. Gilson, Seeking Competitive Bids Versus Pure Passivity in Tender
Offer Defense, 35 Stan. L. Rev. 51, 53 (1982) (considering strategies “to exploit the invest-
ment in information”).
207. Id.
208. See id. (noting that part of the takeover strategy is “to identify a target whose
value can be increased by displacing inefficient management”).
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fundamentally sound, in which case the raider can leave the managers in
place and reap the proﬁts from the course they were already pursing.
The other shareholder strategy for challenging the direction of a
corporation with dispersed ownership is to persuade holders of a majo-
rity of shares to support the challenger’s proposal in a proxy contest.
This is the strategy pursued by activist hedge funds.209 Like raiders, acti-
vist funds typically begin a control contest by acquiring a toehold stake
through the stock market.210 But instead of then making a tender offer,
activists initiate, or threaten to initiate, a proxy contest in which they ask
other shareholders to support their proposals to replace incumbent
directors, increase dividends, or change the ﬁrm’s capital or governance
structure.211
The possibility that a raider or activist fund will contest control of a
ﬁrm keeps agent costs in check.212 But because raiders and activists some-
times mistakenly target ﬁrms whose managers are in fact competent and
loyal,213 the dispersed-ownership structure—which makes control contests
possible—also entails signiﬁcant principal costs.
Agency-cost theory suggests that governance structures should be
arranged vertically, according to their quality, with the structure that
minimizes agent conﬂict costs (direct democracy) on top and the one
that maximizes them (dual-class shares) at the bottom. Under principal-
cost theory, by contrast, no structure is inherently superior or inferior, as
each offers a distinct tradeoff between principal costs and agent costs
that may be ideal for a particular ﬁrm.
IV. PRINCIPAL-COST THEORY VERSUS AGENCY-COST ESSENTIALISM:
IMPLICATIONS
Not only does principal-cost theory provide a more compelling
explanation for the range of governance structures that ﬁrms adopt, but
its more comprehensive account of the considerations that shape those
structures also yields better empirical predictions and wiser policy prescrip-
tions. The theory’s potential implications are numerous; the discussion
below addresses implications for several prominent current controversies.
209. See Kahan & Rock, Hedge Funds, supra note 60, at 1088–89 (noting that hedge
funds “usually seek only minority representation on the board” and “need the support of
others”).
210. See, e.g., Gilson & Gordon, supra note 60, at 900.
211. Id.
212. See infra section IV.A.3 (discussing hostile takeovers).
213. See Coffee & Palia, supra note 174, at 583 (noting that target companies often
have lower Tobin’s Q scores and less “value orientation” but arguing that these metrics are
not necessarily “proof of poor managerial performance or high agency costs”).
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A. Empirical Predictions
Agency-cost essentialism predicts that, because some governance
structures are inherently superior to others, ﬁrms that adopt certain
structures will consistently generate higher ﬁnancial returns.214 The supe-
rior structures are those that most empowers shareholders to exercise
control and hold managers accountable.215 If a ﬁrm adopts a structure
that falls short of this ideal, only two explanations are possible. The ﬁrst
involves a kind of deception: Managers have duped investors into
funding a ﬁrm with a governance feature that, by enabling managers to
sacriﬁce ﬁrm value to their private interests, will provide the investors
with inferior returns.216 The alternative explanation is that the managers
have bargained for a structure that indulges the managers’ exceptional
fondness for control, for which the managers were willing to give up
monetary compensation.
Principal-cost theory makes different predictions. It states that a
ﬁrm’s governance structure is irrelevant unless ﬁrm-speciﬁc elements are
taken into account. If ﬁrms were identical and the parties who owned
and managed them were interchangeable, then any reallocation of con-
trol rights between investors and managers would increase one type of
cost and decrease the other type by equal amounts. Since total control
costs would not change, the degree of delegation—and hence the gover-
nance structure—would be irrelevant. It is only when ﬁrms have different
attributes that differences in governance structures matter, as each ﬁrm
aims at ﬁnding its optimal structure. Moreover, parties do not structure
ﬁrms to minimize agency costs; rather, they structure them to minimize
the sum of agent costs and principal costs, a ﬁrm-speciﬁc undertaking.
Therefore, there should be no consistent correlation across ﬁrms
between ﬁnancial returns and particular structural features. If such a
correlation is found, then two explanations are possible. One is that ﬁrm-
speciﬁc attributes, not the particular structural feature, explain the
difference in value. Once studies properly control for those attributes,
the correlation will disappear. The second possible explanation is that an
exogenous shock in the legal, economic, or ﬁnancial environment has
thrown off the balance between principal costs and agent costs, leaving a
number of ﬁrms with governance structures that no longer suit their
attributes. After such a shock, ﬁrms will require time to adapt their
214. See infra text accompanying notes 225, 230 (describing agency-cost-essentialist
predictions in the context of the division of cash ﬂows and dual-class share structures).
215. See infra text accompanying note 235 (discussing such a structural feature—the
hostile takeover).
216. See Lucian A. Bebchuk, Letting Shareholders Set the Rules, 119 Harv. L. Rev.
1784, 1789–91 (2006) (arguing that markets do not impose constraints on management
and that shareholders rather than managers bear the costs when ﬁrms go public with sub-
optimal governance structures).
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structures to the changed environment. Any correlation between gover-
nance structure and ﬁrm value will thus be temporary, which studies of
the ﬁrms’ performance over time will conﬁrm.
It is important to note that principal-cost theory does not predict
that, even in the absence of exogenous shocks, every ﬁrm will always have
its ideal governance structure. In other words, the theory is not built
upon an assumption that markets are perfectly efficient. At any given
moment, and even in the absence of large-scale, exogenous shocks, some
ﬁrms may have structures that delegate too much control to managers,
while others may have structures that delegate too little. Such structural
misﬁts will be the natural result of transaction costs and of the uncer-
tainty that a ﬁrm’s organizers inevitably face. Those who structure a ﬁrm
can only make educated guesses about its future operations, personnel,
and other attributes. As the future unfolds and contingencies become
certainties, the ﬁrm’s optimal structure may prove to differ from its
selected structure. The ﬁrm can then try to make a midcourse correc-
tion, but transaction costs and other factors may impede the adaptation
process, during which structure-based underperformance will persist.
Such structural gaps will, however, be distributed randomly, meaning
that they should yield no long-term, discernable correlation between ﬁrm
value and particular governance features. In other words, when a gap
opens between a ﬁrm’s optimal governance structure and its selected
structure, the resulting loss of ﬁrm value is just as likely to result from
excessive principal costs (reﬂecting inadequate delegation to managers)
as from excessive agent costs (reﬂecting overdelegation to managers). A
random distribution of errors will occur because agent costs and princi-
pal costs are both foreseeable to ﬁrm organizers, and there is no reason
that organizers should systematically underestimate the future magnitude
of one type of cost relative to the other, especially when they internalize
the costs of selecting a suboptimal structure. Agency-cost essentialism
implicitly assumes, by contrast, that ﬁrm organizers consistently overem-
power managers, meaning that they systematically underestimate agent
costs or overestimate principal costs.217
The two theories also offer different predictions about what will
happen to firms when legal reform imposes a particular structural feature.
Agency-cost essentialism suggests that such reform will increase average
ﬁrm value if the mandatory feature empowers shareholders but decrease
average firm value if it disempowers them.218 Principal-cost theory predicts
that such reform will always cause an initial drop in average ﬁrm value.
Firms that would beneﬁt from the feature will have adopted it already;
217. See supra text accompanying notes 69–70.
218. See infra sections IV.A.5–.6 (discussing how majority voting and proxy access can
reduce agent costs).
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the law therefore imposes the feature only on ﬁrms for which it is ineffi-
cient, driving down their values. But the loss should abate over time, as
ﬁrms can mitigate the impact of a mandatory rule by altering other struc-
tural features, their capital structures, and attributes such as their choice
of business strategy.219 By contrast, scholars who focus on agency costs
usually take a static view: If a change in the law disempowers sharehol-
ders, the resulting loss of ﬁrm value will be permanent in magnitude.220
To be sure, the ability of ﬁrms to adapt to governance-structure
mandates does not mean that the mandates are costless. The process of
updating a governance structure requires ﬁrms to incur transaction costs
that vary depending on whether the necessary adjustment entails, for
example, the adoption of a new bylaw (which a board of directors can
typically accomplish by resolution), a charter amendment (which requires
both a board resolution and a shareholder vote), a change in capital
structure or dividend policy, a change in business strategy, a going-private
transaction or other change in the identity of investors, or a change in
management. Such adaptations can entail signiﬁcant delay, during which
the loss of ﬁrm value attributable to the mandate will continue. Finally,
the axes along which ﬁrms can adjust may only permit a partial correc-
tion, leaving a residual loss of firm value that persists indefinitely. In short,
principal-cost theory predicts that firms can adjust their control structures
and other attributes to mitigate the cost of a structural mandate; it does
not predict that firms can eliminate the costs of a mandate altogether.
A ﬁnal difference in predictions pertains to legal reform that per-
mits, but does not require, ﬁrms to adopt a new structural feature. If the
new option enables ﬁrms to disempower shareholders, agency-cost essen-
tialism suggests that self-interested managers will cause their ﬁrms to
adopt it, driving down average ﬁrm value.221 If, on the other hand, the
new option empowers shareholders, ﬁrms will shun it, and so the reform
will have little effect. The implication is that shareholder-empowering
reform must be mandatory to be effective.222 Principal-cost theory, by con-
trast, suggests that the appearance of a new option on the governance-
structure menu will always increase average ﬁrm value. Firms for which
219. See infra notes 261–265 and accompanying text (describing a pair of studies that
found that companies subject to a Massachusetts law requiring staggered boards initially
lost value but rebounded due to their adoption of business strategies focused on research
and development).
220. Cf. infra notes 297–300 and accompanying text (noting rules favored by agency-
cost essentialists for shifting control to shareholders).
221. See supra text accompanying notes 44–45.
222. Or at least the default should be an opt-out provision. See, e.g., Lucian Arye
Bebchuk & Assaf Hamdani, Optimal Defaults for Corporate Law Evolution, 96 Nw. U. L.
Rev. 489, 492–93 (2002) (advocating default rules that restrict management on grounds
that “relatively little will be lost because both shareholders and managers will support a
charter amendment opting out of [the] inefficient arrangement”).
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the new option is disadvantageous will ignore it, while firms that would
beneﬁt will adopt it, exploiting the opportunity to decrease control costs
by better tailoring their governance structures to their particular attributes.
With these general predictions in mind, we consider now several
topics in corporate governance that empiricists have studied. As the
reader will note, for each of the topics surveyed, the empirical literature
offers conﬂicting ﬁndings. The inconclusive nature of the empirical stu-
dies contradicts agency-cost essentialism, which predicts that shareholder-
empowering governance features will always outperform their alternatives.223
But conﬂicting ﬁndings make sense within the principal-cost framework
when studies differ in the degree to which they control for ﬁrm-speciﬁc
characteristics and for ﬁrms’ capacities to adjust their structures over
time based on changes in internal factors and the external environment.
For each topic, we consider whether the empirical results favor
agency-cost essentialism or principal-cost theory. Given the numerous
studies in the corporate-governance literature from the last forty years,
during which agency costs have been the focus, our survey is necessarily
abridged. We nonetheless believe it is fair to say that the trends in the
empirical literature favor the predictions of principal-cost theory.
1. The Division of Cash Flows. — According to the Jensen-Meckling
model, allocating more of a ﬁrm’s cash ﬂows to investors increases agency
costs by widening the divide between ownership from control.224 Based
on this observation, some scholars have predicted that ﬁrms in which
management receives a larger proportion of the cash ﬂows will have
higher values.225 Interestingly, the Jensen-Meckling model itself contra-
dicts this prediction, as it depicts a tradeoff between managerial private
beneﬁts and economies of scale, and it predicts that each ﬁrm will strike
its own, optimal tradeoff.226 Principal-cost theory yields the same predic-
223. See supra notes 69–70 and accompanying text.
224. See Jensen & Meckling, supra note 1, at 309.
225. See, e.g., Benjamin E. Hermalin & Michael S. Weisbach, The Effects of Board
Composition and Direct Incentives on Firm Performance, 20 Fin. Mgmt. 101, 111 (1991)
(ﬁnding that corporate performance increases when management ownership rises to 1%
but decreases at higher levels, possibly due to increasing insulation from disciplinary
devices that more than offsets the increased alignment of interests between managers and
shareholders); Clifford G. Holderness, Randall S. Kroszner & Dennis P. Sheehan, Were the
Good Old Days that Good? Changes in Managerial Stock Ownership Since the Great
Depression, 54 J. Fin. 435, 466 (1999) (ﬁnding that managerial ownership nonlinearly
increases and then decreases in ﬁrm volatility); John J. McConnell & Henri Servaes,
Additional Evidence on Equity Ownership and Corporate Value, 27 J. Fin. Econ. 595, 604
(1990) (ﬁnding that the “ownership structure of equity has an important inﬂuence on
corporate value”); Randall Morck, Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, Management
Ownership and Market Valuation, 20 J. Fin. Econ. 293, 311 (1988) (ﬁnding that as board
ownership rises, ﬁrm value initially increases, then falls, and ﬁnally rises slowly again).
226. See Jensen & Meckling, supra note 1, at 352 (“[F]orces exist to determine an
equilibrium distribution of outside ownership. If the costs of reducing the dispersion of
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tion, but for a different reason. Granting a larger proportion of the cash
ﬂows to managers reduces agent conﬂict costs but increases principal
conﬂict costs. Given this tradeoff, ﬁrms will tailor the division of cash
ﬂows to their speciﬁc attributes and governance structures, yielding no
general relationship between the division of cash ﬂows and ﬁrm value.
When the question has been investigated empirically, some studies
have found that firm value varies depending on changes in management’s
share of ownership; from this, the studies’ authors have concluded that
some arrangements are superior to others.227 When, however, these studies
are corrected for missing controls and other problems, the relationship
between the division of cash ﬂows and ﬁrm performance tends to disap-
pear, as principal-cost theory predicts.228
2. Dual-Class Shares. — Relative to the dispersed-ownership structure,
the dual-class share structure gives more power to management, making
it harder for outside shareholders to hold managers accountable.229
Accordingly, many scholars predict that ﬁrms with dual-class shares will
perform poorly.230 Taken as a whole, however, the empirical studies do
not support this claim.231 While some studies have linked the dual-class
share structure to lower ﬁrm value,232 others have found no correlation
ownership are lower than the beneﬁts . . . from reducing the agency costs, it will pay some
individual or group of individuals to buy shares . . . to reduce the dispersion of ownership.”).
227. See supra note 225.
228. See Harold Demsetz & Belén Villalonga, Ownership Structure and Corporate
Performance, 7 J. Corp. Fin. 209, 211 (2001) (supporting “the belief that ownership struc-
ture is endogenous but not the belief that ownership structure affects ﬁrm performance”);
Demsetz & Lehn, supra note 30, at 1176 (ﬁnding that “the structure of corporate owner-
ship varies systematically in ways that are consistent with value maximization”); Charles P.
Himmelberg, R. Glenn Hubbard & Darius Palia, Understanding the Determinants of
Managerial Ownership and the Link Between Ownership and Performance, 53 J. Fin. Econ.
353, 381 (1999) (ﬁnding that “it becomes difficult to conclude that changes in ﬁrm mana-
gerial ownership affect performance” when “ﬁrm characteristics and ﬁrm ﬁxed effects”
are controlled).
229. As mentioned earlier, the management and the controlling shareholder are
treated as a unity, as the controlling shareholder can replace management. See supra text
accompanying note 198.
230. See, e.g., Bebchuk et al., Stock Pyramids, supra note 7, at 310–11 (“[T]he agency
costs associated with [controlling-minority-structure] ﬁrms increase very rapidly as the
fraction of equity cash-ﬂow rights held by controllers declines.”).
231. See Renée Adams & Daniel Ferreira, One Share-One Vote: The Empirical
Evidence, 12 Rev. Fin. 51, 84 (2008) (surveying the empirical literature on dual-class share
structures and concluding that “the ﬁndings . . . on ownership disproportionality often
disagree” and that “simple conclusions may not be possible [because] [o]wnership dispro-
portionality may destroy the value of outside equity in some contexts, but not in others”).
232. See, e.g., Gompers et al., Extreme Governance, supra note 182, at 1051 (ﬁnding
that in “single-stage regressions . . . strong evidence [exists] that ﬁrm value is increasing in
insiders’ cash-ﬂow rights and decreasing in insider voting rights” and that in “instrumental
variable regressions, the point estimates are similar but the signiﬁcance levels are lower”);
Masulis et al., supra note 183, at 1697 (ﬁnding that “managers with greater excess control
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once ﬁrm-speciﬁc attributes are taken into account,233 as principal-cost
theory predicts. In addition, studies have found that firms that switch from
dispersed ownership to dual-class shares experience an increase in value,
a result that principal-cost theory can explain but agency-cost essentialism
cannot.234
3. Takeover Defenses. — Numerous prominent scholars have voiced
support for hostile takeovers as a device for disciplining managers.235 The
stronger version of this position is that boards should be completely passive
rights over cash ﬂow rights are more prone to pursue private beneﬁts at shareholders’
expense” and that “firm value is decreasing in insider excess control rights”); Scott B. Smart,
Ramabhadran S. Thirumalai & Chad J. Zutter, What’s in a Vote? The Short- and Long-Run
Impact of Dual-Class Equity on IPO Firm Values, 45 J. Acct. & Econ. 94, 94 (2008) (ﬁnding
that “relative to fundamentals, dual-class ﬁrms trade at lower prices than do single-class
ﬁrms, both at the IPO and for at least the subsequent 5 years,” and that “when duals unify
their share classes, statistically and economically signiﬁcant value gains occur”).
233. See, e.g., Renée B. Adams & João A.C. Santos, Identifying the Effect of Managerial
Control on Firm Performance, 41 J. Acct. & Econ. 55, 55 (2006) (“Contrary to the belief
that managerial control is purely detrimental, we ﬁnd that it has positive effects on perfor-
mance over at least some range.”); Ekkehart Böhmer, Gary C. Sanger & Sanjay Varshney,
The Effect of Consolidated Control on Firm Performance: The Case of Dual-Class IPOs, in
Empirical Issues in Raising Equity Capital 95, 95 (Mario Levis ed., 1996) (ﬁnding that
dual-class IPOs “outperform . . . matched single-class counterparts in . . . returns” and
“accounting measures of ﬁrm performance” and concluding that “going public with a
dual-class equity structure has net beneﬁts for investors”); M. Megan Partch, The Creation
of a Class of Limited Voting Common Stock and Shareholder Wealth, 18 J. Fin. Econ. 313,
313 (1987) (“There is no evidence that current shareholders are harmed by the creation
of limited voting common stock.”).
234. See, e.g., Kenneth Lehn, Jeffry Netter & Annette Poulsen, Consolidating Corporate
Control: Dual-Class Recapitalizations Versus Leveraged Buyouts, 27 J. Fin. Econ. 557, 557
(1990) (ﬁnding that dual-class recapitalizing ﬁrms grow faster than ﬁrms in a control
group, and concluding that “[t]hese results . . . illustrat[e] that the method and effects of
consolidating corporate control are systematically related to ﬁrm attributes”); Valentin
Dimitrov & Prem C. Jain, Recapitalization of One Class of Common Stock into Dual-Class:
Growth and Long-Run Stock Returns 1 (Sept. 1, 2004) (unpublished manuscript), http://
ssrn.com/abstract=422080 (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review) (ﬁnding that “dual-class
recapitalizations are shareholder value enhancing corporate initiatives” and that “stockhol-
ders, on average, earn signiﬁcant positive abnormal returns” following the announcement
of the recapitalization, and ﬁnding no “evidence of managerial entrenchment”).
235. The leading voice is Professor Henry Manne. See Henry G. Manne, Cash Tender
Offers for Shares—A Reply to Chairman Cohen, 1967 Duke L.J. 231, 236–37 (observing
that the threat of raiders encourages managers to manage their companies as efficiently as
possible); see also Bebchuk, Undistorted Choice, supra note 119, 1765–68 (noting that
acquisitions may “produce efficiency gains by . . . improving management”); Easterbrook &
Fischel, The Proper Role, supra note 56, at 1169 (noting that a tender offer “polices
managers” and “disciplines or replaces them if they stray too far from the service of the
shareholders”); Gilson, Structural Approach, supra note 56, at 844 (observing that the
tender offer is the “only displacement mechanism” with the potential to constrain manage-
ment self-dealing).
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when threatened by a raider, with no recourse to defensive measures.236 A
more moderate view allows defensive measures, but only if used to facili-
tate an auction of the target.237
Principal-cost theory implies that hostile raiders can generate costs
as well as beneﬁts. By using a tender offer to aggregate shareholder con-
trol in the hands of a single individual, a raider does indeed reduce agent
costs. At the same time, however, allowing shareholders to accept a tender
offer without board approval could generate principal costs. If the share-
holders fail to appreciate the true value of the incumbent managers’ stra-
tegy, they could tender at an inadequate price, thus giving away the ﬁrm’s
hidden value.238 The anticipation of such value transfers from public
shareholders to raiders may generate principal competence costs by
raising ﬁrms’ cost of equity capital. Similarly, groups of shareholders who
would tender their shares because they prefer short-term proﬁts at the
expense of long-term returns might generate principal conﬂict costs by
inducing the firm’s managers to take expensive self-protective measures.239
Permitting hostile takeovers could thus increase or decrease overall
control costs, with the effect varying by ﬁrm based on factors such as the
personal characteristics of its managers and shareholders, and its industry
and competitive environment.240 For ﬁrms whose management is untrust-
worthy and whose business is easy for shareholders to understand, allo-
cating control over takeovers to shareholders could reduce total control
costs. But for ﬁrms whose management is trustworthy and whose business
is difficult for shareholders to understand, allocating control to boards
could be more efficient.
The same general analysis applies to speciﬁc takeover defenses.
Consider, for example, poison pills, which impose prohibitive costs on
raiders who acquire a large stake in a ﬁrm without board approval.241 To
236. See Easterbrook & Fischel, The Proper Role, supra note 56, at 1194–204 (advo-
cating antiresistance provisions that would prevent management from defeating tender
offers).
237. See Gilson, Structural Approach, supra note 56, at 875–81 (suggesting a rule
permitting management actions that facilitate shareholder decisionmaking and prohi-
biting management actions that interfere with shareholder decisions on tender offers).
238. But see Bernard Black & Reinier Kraakman, Delaware’s Takeover Law: The
Uncertain Search for Hidden Value, 96 Nw. U. L. Rev. 521, 528–34 (2002) (rejecting the
claim of hidden value).
239. See Brian J. Bushee, The Inﬂuence of Institutional Investors on Myopic R&D
Investment Behavior, 73 Acct. Rev. 305, 305 (1998) (arguing that a high level of institutional
ownership by institutions exhibiting high portfolio turnover, diversiﬁcation, and momen-
tum trading signiﬁcantly increases managerial incentives to pursue short-term projects).
240. See F.M. Scherer, Corporate Takeovers: The Efficiency Arguments, 2 J. Econ.
Persp. 69, 74–76 (1988) (interpreting an empirical study that used a line-of-business ap-
proach to conclude that takeovers do not have uniform effects on targets’ long-term value).
241. See Suzanne S. Dawson, Robert J. Pence & David S. Stone, Poison Pill Defensive
Measures, 42 Bus. Law. 423, 426–32 (1987).
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circumvent a pill, a raider must take control of the target’s board through
a proxy ﬁght, which requires time and money.242 The pill thus increases
board power relative to shareholder power, leading some scholars to
condemn it as an entrenchment device that increases agency costs and
thus reduces ﬁrm value.243 But a pill can also reduce principal costs. For-
cing raiders to wage proxy ﬁghts can reduce collective-action problems
among shareholders,244 and the pill’s capacity to encourage competing
bids reduces the risk that shareholders will tender at an inadequate
price.245 Once again, the net effect on control costs will depend on the
speciﬁc ﬁrm.246 If honest managers are pursuing a business strategy with
hidden value, a pill could reduce principal costs more than it increases
agent costs.
A second common takeover defense is the staggered board, only one
third, rather than the full slate, of whose members stands for election
each year.247 The practical consequence of a staggered board is that a
raider must win proxy ﬁghts at two consecutive annual shareholder
meetings to obtain control of the company.248 Proponents argue that a
staggered board provides stability and permits greater continuity in stra-
tegic planning.249 But scholars who focus on agency costs harshly criticize
the staggered board as an entrenchment mechanism that, when com-
242. See Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love
the Pill: Adaptive Responses to Takeover Law, 69 U. Chi. L. Rev. 871, 913 (2002)
[hereinafter Kahan & Rock, Adaptive Responses] (“To overcome a pill, a hostile raider
must replace the board in a proxy contest. In a company with a staggered board, this takes
over a year . . . .”).
243. See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case Against Board Veto in Corporate
Takeovers, 69 U. Chi. L. Rev. 973, 991–94 (2002) (examining the agency costs of poison
pills).
244. Kahan & Rock, Adaptive Responses, supra note 242, at 903.
245. See Randall A. Heron & Erik Lie, On the Use of Poison Pills and Defensive
Payouts by Takeover Targets, 79 J. Bus. 1783, 1801–03 (2006) (presenting evidence that
poison pills increase bids and deal premiums).
246. See Heron & Lie, supra note 245, at 1794 (noting that responses to unsolicited
takeovers differ based on a host of factors, including “the consequence . . . for incumbent
management, the premium offered to shareholders, management’s assessment of ﬁrm
value, and the target’s bargaining power”). That ﬁrms do not have a uniform response to
poison pills is reﬂected in the conﬂicting empirical work on the subject. Compare Michael
Ryngaert, The Effect of Poison Pill Securities on Shareholder Wealth, 20 J. Fin. Econ. 377,
386–411 (1988) (concluding from empirical evidence that poison pills do not, on average,
beneﬁt shareholders), with Heron & Lie, supra note 245, at 1801–03 (presenting empirical
evidence that poison pills increase bids and premiums).
247. See Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 141(d) (2016).
248. Air Prods. & Chems., Inc. v. Airgas, Inc., 16 A.3d 48, 114–15 (Del. Ch. 2011)
(noting that the Delaware Supreme Court’s opinion in Versata Enters. v. Selectica, 5 A.3d
586 (Del. 2010), observed that raiders can take control of staggered boards if willing to
wait two years).
249. See, e.g., Lipton, supra note 174.
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bined with a pill, makes a ﬁrm essentially impervious to raids.250 Their
campaign against the staggered board has been effective: Over the past
decade, Professor Lucian Bebchuk and Harvard Law School’s Shareholder
Rights Project have persuaded the boards of approximately one-third of
all S&P 500 companies to destagger.251 Before this campaign, the majority
of S&P 500 companies had staggered boards; now, most do not.252
Principal-cost theory suggests that staggered boards increase agent
costs but reduce principal costs. Due to a lack of information or a
misunderstanding of their ﬁrm’s business model, shareholders will some-
times fail to recognize their ﬁrm’s hidden value and thus might tender to
a raider at an inadequate price. Fearing such mistakes, boards might
eschew complex, long-term business strategies that would ultimately deli-
ver higher shareholder returns. Staggered boards make it harder for
shareholders to make such mistakes, freeing boards to pursue multiyear
strategies.253 As with poison pills, some ﬁrms will beneﬁt from staggered
boards, while others will not.254
Empirical studies of takeover defenses have yielded mixed results.255
While several studies have found that antitakeover devices reduce ﬁrm
value,256 others have identiﬁed ﬂaws in these studies,257 and a third set of
250. Bebchuk et al., Force of Staggered Boards, supra note 6, at 904–08 (explaining
that for ﬁrms with staggered boards, the poison pill provides an “impenetrable barrier to
control acquisitions”).
251. See Lucian Bebchuk, Scott Hirst & June Rhee, Towards the Declassiﬁcation of
S&P 500 Boards, 3 Harv. Bus. L. Rev. 157, 171 & tbl.6 (2013); Steven Davidoff Solomon,
The Case Against Staggered Boards, N.Y. Times: Dealbook (Mar. 20, 2012, 12:43 PM), http:
//dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/03/20/the-case-against-staggered-boards (on ﬁle with the
Columbia Law Review) [hereinafter Solomon, The Case] (describing Bebchuk’s campaign).
252. See Solomon, The Case, supra note 251 (noting that “302 S&P 500 companies
had staggered boards in 2002” but by 2012 “the ﬁgure ha[d] fallen to 126”).
253. See Lipton, supra note 174.
254. See K.J. Martijn Cremers, Lubomir P. Litov & Simone M. Sepe, Staggered Boards
and Long-Term Firm Value, Revisited 9–25 (Nov. 2016) (unpublished manuscript),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2364165 (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review) (ﬁnding that
the effect of a staggered board on ﬁrm value differs depending on the characteristics of
the ﬁrm).
255. See Miroslava Straska & H. Gregory Waller, Antitakeover Provisions and
Shareholder Wealth: A Survey of the Literature, 49 J. Fin. & Quantitative Analysis 933, 950
(2014) (reviewing forty years of studies and concluding that “[d]espite the considerable
amount of time and attention devoted to examining how antitakeover provisions affect
shareholders, the net effects of these provisions on shareholder wealth remain uncertain”).
256. See, e.g., Paul H. Malatesta & Ralph A. Walkling, Poison Pill Securities: Stockholder
Wealth, Proﬁtability, and Ownership Structure, 20 J. Fin. Econ. 347, 362–63 (1988)
(concluding from statistical analysis that “the adoption of poison pill defenses reduces
stockholder wealth”).
257. Emiliano M. Catan & Marcel Kahan, The Law and Finance of Antitakeover
Statutes, 68 Stan. L. Rev. 629, 650–64 (2016); John C. Coates IV, Takeover Defenses in the
Shadow of the Pill: A Critique of the Scientific Evidence, 79 Tex. L. Rev. 271, 280–86 (2000).
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studies has found that ﬁrms with certain attributes can increase their
value by adopting antitakeover devices,258 as principal-cost theory predicts.
Similarly conﬂicting results are seen in studies that seek to link staggered
boards to reduced ﬁrm value: Some ﬁnd such a link,259 but others that
control for firm-specific characteristics find no such connection.260
Perhaps the best illustration of the predictive power of principal-cost
theory on this topic is a pair of studies of a 1990 Massachusetts law that
required all public ﬁrms incorporated in that state to have staggered
boards.261 An event study by Professor Robert Daines found that the law
reduced shareholder wealth.262 This ﬁnding is consistent with agency-cost
essentialism, which suggests that staggered boards are always value-de-
creasing; it also is consistent with principal-cost theory, which holds that a
mandatory structural feature harms ﬁrms whose cost-minimizing gover-
nance structure does not include that feature.263 However, in a recent
study, Daines and two coauthors revisited the Massachusetts ﬁrms ﬁfteen
years later and found that those with speciﬁc attributes—namely, a high
degree of innovation and investment in research and development—had
rebounded in value.264 The authors concluded that staggered boards can
258. See, e.g., Dalida Kadyrzhanova & Matthew Rhodes-Kropf, Concentrating on
Governance, 66 J. Fin. 1649, 1654–82 (2011) (developing a model to predict which corpo-
rate governance tradeoffs ﬁrms should adopt based on their characteristics); Scott C. Linn
& John J. McConnell, An Empirical Investigation of the Impact of ‘Antitakeover’
Amendments on Common Stock Prices, 11 J. Fin. Econ. 361, 397 (1983) (ﬁnding, after
empirical analysis, that antitakeover amendments are associated with an “increase in
common stock prices and that the removal of antitakeover amendments is associated with
a decline in stock prices”); see also Straska & Waller, supra note 255, at 938–40 (ﬁnding
that ﬁrm value increases in antitakeover indexes for ﬁrms with low bargaining power).
259. See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk & Alma Cohen, The Costs of Entrenched Boards, 78
J. Fin. Econ. 409, 419–26 (2005).
260. See, e.g., Thomas W. Bates, David A. Becher & Michael L. Lemmon, Board
Classiﬁcation and Managerial Entrenchment: Evidence from the Market for Corporate
Control, 87 J. Fin. Econ. 656, 658 (2008) (ﬁnding that “the evidence is inconsistent with
the view that board classiﬁcation is associated with managerial entrenchment and instead
suggests that classiﬁcation improves the relative bargaining power of target managers on
behalf of their constituent shareholders”).
261. See Robert Daines, Shelley Xin Li & Charles C.Y. Wang, Can Staggered Boards
Improve Value? Evidence from the Massachusetts Natural Experiment 4 (Stanford Law
Sch. John M. Olin Program in Law & Econ., Paper No. 498, 2016) [hereinafter Daines et
al., Can Staggered Boards Improve Value], http://ssrn.com/abstract=2836463 (on ﬁle
with the Columbia Law Review) (reporting on the value of impacted ﬁrms eleven years after
an initial study); Robert M. Daines, Do Classiﬁed Boards Affect Firm Value? Takeover
Defenses After the Poison Pill 27 (unpublished manuscript) (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law
Review) [hereinafter Daines, Classiﬁed Boards] (providing “evidence of investors’ reaction
to a 1990 Massachusetts law . . . that imposed [staggered] boards on its public ﬁrms”).
262. Daines, Classiﬁed Boards, supra note 261, at 27–28.
263. See supra text accompanying notes 221–222.
264. Daines et al., Can Staggered Boards Improve Value, supra note 261, at 4.
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beneﬁt ﬁrms with certain attributes.265 This result is consistent with prin-
cipal-cost theory, which predicts that ﬁrms will respond to external legal
shocks by adjusting other structural features as well as attributes such as
their business strategies.
4. Hedge Fund Activism. — Scholars whose primary concern is agency
costs strongly support activist hedge funds,266 whose business model is to
challenge incumbent directors of public companies through publicity
campaigns and proxy ﬁghts.267 Such challenges overcome shareholders’
rational apathy and institutional investors’ rational reticence, increasing
the power of shareholder voting rights and thus reducing agent costs.268
For example, an activist fund might force empire-building managers to
reduce inefficient capital expenditures.269 Yet activist funds can also gene-
rate principal costs, a downside that their academic supporters dismiss.
Because information asymmetries can prevent shareholders from differ-
entiating good activist campaigns from bad ones, a fund might force
managers to slash capital expenditures that are actually efficient.270 Ulti-
mately, the impact of activism on control costs—the reduction in agent
costs, net of the increase in principal costs—will be speciﬁc to the target
ﬁrm.
Empirical studies of hedge fund activism have produced mixed
results.271 All studies show that ﬁrms experience an initial spike in share
price when the market learns that they have been targeted.272 But the
long-term impact on share price is unclear: Some studies have found that
activism improves long-term performance,273 but others have found ﬂaws
in these studies.274 A third set of studies has found that activism ultimately
harms its targets,275 a result that principal-cost theory can explain but
265. Id. at 4–5, 27 (ﬁnding that staggered boards can be beneﬁcial when ﬁrms and
investors face information asymmetries, which is especially likely when ﬁrms are young,
innovative, or reliant on research and development).
266. See, e.g., Bebchuk et al., Long-Term, supra note 62, at 1087–89 (presenting
evidence refuting the claim that shareholder activism reduces long-term ﬁrm value).
267. See Kahan & Rock, Hedge Funds, supra note 60, at 1029.
268. See Gilson & Gordon, supra note 60, at 897–98 (noting that the interaction
between institutional investors and shareholder activists “can mitigate agency costs”).
269. See Bebchuk et al., Long-Term, supra note 62, at 1136 (arguing that shareholder
activism can combat “management’s tendency to avoid distributing excess cash or assets to
shareholders”).
270. See Coffee & Palia, supra note 174, at 41–49 (describing the activist hedge fund
practice of slashing research and development in pharmaceutical industry targets).
271. See id. at 49–64 (reviewing and analyzing the empirical studies).
272. See, e.g., id. at 64 (concluding “the evidence is clearest that there is a short-term
positive stock price reaction to a Schedule 13D’s ﬁling”).
273. See, e.g., Bebchuk et al., Long-Term, supra note 62, at 1155.
274. See, e.g., Coffee & Palia, supra note 174, at 53.
275. See K.J. Martijn Cremers, Erasmo Giambona, Simone M. Sepe & Ye Wang, Hedge
Fund Activism and Long-Term Firm Value 2 (Jan. 2016) (unpublished manuscript),
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agency-cost essentialism cannot. Furthermore, all existing studies of acti-
vism have considered only its impact on target ﬁrms and thus have not
investigated whether the mere risk of being targeted causes managers of
other ﬁrms to take preventative measures that increase or reduce ﬁrm
value.276 In other words, activist campaigns could generate both positive
and negative externalities, but no study investigates them, precluding any
conclusion about activism’s net impact on social value.
5. Majority Voting. — The default rule for Delaware corporations is
plurality voting, which permits an uncontested slate of directors to be
elected even if holders of a majority of shares express disapproval by
withholding their votes.277 The alternative rule is majority voting, under
which directors who do not receive majority support must resign their
seats.278 Majority voting thus provides a cheap substitute for a proxy ﬁght.
Because majority voting increases shareholder power, many scholars view
it positively.279 But an increase in shareholder power raises principal costs
and thus could increase total control costs at many ﬁrms. Unsurprisingly,
studies of majority voting have produced inconclusive results: While one
ﬁnds a positive effect,280 others ﬁnd no impact on shareholder value.281
http://ccl.yale.edu/sites/default/ﬁles/ﬁles/leo16_Sepe.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law
Review) (ﬁnding that “ﬁrms targeted by activist hedge funds improve less in value subse-
quent to the start of an activist hedge fund campaign than ex-ante similarly poorly per-
forming control ﬁrms that are not subject to hedge fund activism”).
276. See Coffee & Palia, supra note 174, at 7–8 (noting the paucity of evidence about
the marketwide impact of activism).
277. Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 216(3) (2016) (“In the absence of such speciﬁcation in
the certiﬁcate of incorporation or bylaws of the corporation . . . [d]irectors shall be
elected by a plurality of the votes of the shares present in person or represented by proxy
at the meeting and entitled to vote on the election of directors.”); see also Joseph A.
Grundfest, Just Vote No: A Minimalist Strategy for Dealing with Barbarians Inside the Gates,
45 Stan. L. Rev. 857, 865–66 (1993) (advocating withholding votes for a symbolic “no”).
278. See, e.g., Stephen J. Choi, Jill E. Fisch, Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, Does
Majority Voting Improve Board Accountability?, 83 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1119, 1124–28 (2016).
279. See, e.g., Majority Voting for Directors, Council of Institutional Inv’rs, http://
www.cii.org/majority_voting_directors [http://perma.cc/RUL3-RME2] (last visited Nov. 2,
2016) (“Majority voting for directors ensures that shareowners’ votes have ‘teeth’, keeping
board members responsive to the shareowners they represent.”).
280. See Yonca Ertimur, Fabrizio Ferri & David Oesch, Does the Director Election
System Matter? Evidence from Majority Voting, 20 Rev. Acct. Stud. 1, 11 (2015) (ﬁnding
that the adoption of shareholder proposals for majority voting is associated with positive
abnormal stock returns).
281. See Jay Cai, Jacqueline L. Garner & Ralph A. Walkling, A Paper Tiger? An
Empirical Analysis of Majority Voting, 21 J. Corp. Fin. 119, 120 (2013) (ﬁnding that the
“adoption of majority voting has little effect on director votes, director turnover, or
improvement of ﬁrm performance”); Choi et al., supra note 278, at 1122 (ﬁnding that
“under plurality voting, the likelihood that a director fails to receive a majority ‘for’ vote is
nineteen times higher than under majority voting”); William K. Sjostrom, Jr. & Young
Sang Kim, Majority Voting for the Election of Directors, 40 Conn. L. Rev. 459, 489–92
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Principal-cost theory predicts that, once one controls for ﬁrm-speciﬁc
characteristics, ﬁrms with majority voting will not consistently outperform
those without it. Studies that do ﬁnd a directional result probably lack
adequate controls or proper samples and therefore are unlikely to be
conﬁrmed by subsequent studies.
6. Proxy Access. — A proxy ﬁght typically costs the challengers about
$6,000,000,282 and the corporation reimburses the challengers only if
they prevail.283 The consequence is a classic collective-action problem
that discourages proxy challenges: Challengers internalize all of the ex-
pected costs of a proxy ﬁght but only a fraction of the expected beneﬁts.
Many commentators have proposed to overcome this disincentive through
proxy access, which permits shareholders with large, long-term holdings
to use the corporation’s proxy materials (and hence the corporation’s
funds) to seek votes for their own partial slates of director candidates.284
Proxy access reinforces majority voting: When directors must resign for
lack of majority support, proxy access enables shareholders, rather than
the remaining incumbent directors, to nominate the replacements.285 In
this way, it reduces agent costs and hence, according to agency-cost essen-
tialism, increases ﬁrm value.286
But proxy access also increases principal costs: Although it facilitates
the replacement of lazy, incompetent, or disloyal directors, it also
increases the risk that shareholders will mistakenly replace good direc-
tors (thus generating principal competence costs) or use greater entrée
to board seats to extract private beneﬁts (generating principal conﬂict
costs). Indeed, we have direct evidence of the latter: Union pension funds
(2007) (ﬁnding no statistically signiﬁcant market reaction to a company’s adoption of
majority voting).
282. See Nickolay Gantchev, The Costs of Shareholder Activism: Evidence from a
Sequential Decision Model, 107 J. Fin. Econ. 610, 623 tbl.7, 624 (2013) (ﬁnding an
average cost of $5.94 million for proxy contests, which includes “printing and postage
costs” and “signiﬁcant disclosure, legal and other fees of hiring proxy solicitors, corporate
governance experts, investment banks, public relations and advertising ﬁrms”).
283. See Recent Developments, Contestants in Proxy Fight Entitled to Reimbursement
of Expenses from Corporate Treasury, 56 Colum. L. Rev. 633, 634–35 (1956) (discussing
when challengers may be reimbursed and noting the uncertainty of whether “losing
insurgents can be reimbursed”).
284. See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case for Shareholder Access to the Ballot, 59
Bus. Law. 43, 47 (2003) [hereinafter Bebchuk, Shareholder Access] (explaining how the
proposal for proxy access “would make it easier for shareholders to elect candidates other
than those proposed by incumbent directors”). A typical proxy-access bylaw would allow
investors owning 3% to 5% of a company’s stock for three or more years to nominate
directors for the company’s board of directors. See id.
285. See id. at 65 (arguing that empowering shareholders to replace directors through
proxy access would “improve[] corporate governance”).
286. See id. at 51–53.
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have used proxy access as a bargaining chip in labor negotiations.287
Whether proxy access will increase288 or decrease289 overall ﬁrm value is
thus difficult to predict ex ante, which the empirical literature confirms.290
7. The G Index. — Finally, the most famous empirical paper cited in
support of agency-cost essentialism is a study of a corporate-governance
index, dubbed the G index, which consists of twenty-four governance
factors (such as a staggered board) that purportedly reduce managerial
accountability.291 The study assigned each ﬁrm an index score equal to
the number of such factors it possessed and then regressed the score
against firm value. The study found a strong negative relationship between
index score and firm value.292 The study’s use of different allocations of
control rights—reﬂected in different G scores—to explain differences in
ﬁrm value contradicts principal-cost theory’s claim that, unless ﬁrms vary
in their attributes, their choice of governance structure is irrelevant.
Although the study’s ﬁnding appears to support agency-cost essentialism,
some academics have criticized the study for methodological ﬂaws and
misspeciﬁcations.293 In addition, a follow-up study showed that six factors
287. See John G. Matsusaka, Oguzhan Ozbas & Irene Yi, Opportunistic Proposals by
Union Shareholders 26 (Univ. of S. Cal. Ctr. for Law & Soc. Sci., Research Paper No.
CLASS15-25, 2016), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2666064 (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law
Review) (ﬁnding evidence of unions using “shareholder proposals opportunistically” in
negotiations).
288. See, e.g., Bo Becker, Daniel Bergstresser & Guhan Subramanian, Does Shareholder
Proxy Access Improve Firm Value? Evidence from the Business Roundtable’s Challenge, 56
J.L. & Econ. 127, 129 (2013) (ﬁnding evidence that shareholders value access); Joanna
Tochman Campbell, T. Colin Campbell, David G. Sirmon, Leonard Bierman & Christopher
S. Tuggle, Shareholder Inﬂuence over Director Nomination via Proxy Access: Implications
for Agency Conﬂict and Stakeholder Value, 33 Strategic Mgmt. J. 1431, 1447 (2012)
(arguing that “additional value is created when owners are granted greater voice in the
ﬁrm’s governance”).
289. See, e.g., Ali C. Akyol, Wei Fen Lim & Patrick Verwijmeren, Shareholders in the
Boardroom: Wealth Effects of the SEC’s Proposal to Facilitate Director Nominations, 47 J.
Fin. & Quantitative Analysis, 1029, 1055 (2012) (presenting evidence that shareholder
access decreases ﬁrm value); David F. Larcker, Gaizka Ormazabal & Daniel J. Taylor, The
Market Reaction to Corporate Governance Regulation, 101 J. Fin. Econ. 431, 433 (2011)
(presenting evidence that increased shareholder access lowers ﬁrm value).
290. See, e.g., Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, The Insigniﬁcance of Proxy Access, 97
Va. L. Rev. 1347, 1426 (2011) (considering the positive and negative effects of proxy access
and concluding that “the net effect of proxy access is likely to be close to zero and surely is
not high enough to get very excited about”).
291. Paul Gompers, Joy Ishii & Andrew Metrick, Corporate Governance and Equity
Prices, 118 Q.J. Econ. 107, 114 (2003).
292. Id. at 144–45.
293. See, e.g., Jianxin (Daniel) Chi, Understanding the Endogeneity Between Firm
Value and Shareholder Rights, 34 Fin. Mgmt. 65, 66 (2005) (ﬁnding that the negative
relationship between the G index and Tobin’s Q runs from G to Q and not vice versa);
John E. Core, Wayne R. Guay & Tjomme O. Rusticus, Does Weak Governance Cause Weak
Stock Returns? An Examination of Firm Operating Performance and Investors’ Expectations,
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related to takeover defenses fully explained the correlation identiﬁed by
the original study.294 And a more recent study has shown that, depending
on ﬁrm-speciﬁc characteristics, only three of those six factors correlate
negatively with ﬁrm value, while the other three correlate positively.295
This trend in studies of the G index conﬁrms principal-cost theory’s
prediction that, as such studies become more reﬁned, fewer structural
elements will correlate with ﬁrm performance.296
B. Implications for Lawmakers
Another important difference between agency-cost essentialism and
principal-cost theory is their policy implications. Scholars who tend
toward essentialism favor mandatory rules that shift control to sharehol-
ders:297 They would ban dual-class shares,298 poison pills,299 and staggered
61 J. Fin. 655, 680–81 (2006) (ﬁnding that weak shareholder rights are unlikely to cause
lower abnormal stock returns and suggesting that market model misspeciﬁcation may
explain the difference in abnormal returns between high and low G-index ﬁrms); K.J.
Martijn Cremers, Vinay B. Nair & Kose John, Takeovers and the Cross-Section of Returns,
22 Rev. Fin. Stud. 1409, 1432 (2009) (ﬁnding that the market model used in the G index
was misspeciﬁed); Shane A. Johnson, Theodore C. Moorman & Sorin Sorescu, A
Reexamination of Corporate Governance and Equity Prices, 22 Rev. Fin. Stud. 4753, 4755
(2009) (ﬁnding that the asset-pricing model used in the G index was misspeciﬁed);
Kenneth Lehn, Sukesh Patro & Mengxin Zhao, Governance Indexes and Valuation: Which
Causes Which?, 13 J. Corp. Fin. 907, 908–09 (2007) (ﬁnding it unlikely that high G index
scores cause lower valuations).
294. See Lucian Bebchuk, Alma Cohen & Allen Ferrell, What Matters in Corporate
Governance?, 22 Rev. Fin. Stud. 783, 823 (2009) (identifying “six entrenching provisions”
that “fully drive the ﬁndings documented by [the] prior research”).
295. K.J. Martijn Cremers, Saura Masconale & Simone M. Sepe, Commitment and
Entrenchment in Corporate Governance, 110 Nw. U. L. Rev. 727, 733 (2016).
296. See, e.g., Sanjai Bhagat, Brian Bolton & Roberta Romano, The Promise and Peril
of Corporate Governance Indices, 108 Colum. L. Rev. 1803, 1808 (2008) (ﬁnding that
“there is no consistent relation between the academic and related commercial governance
indices and corporate performance”); Tatyana Sokolyk, The Effects of Antitakeover
Provisions on Acquisition Targets, 17 J. Corp. Fin. 612, 612 (2011) (ﬁnding that while
individual antitakeover provisions have signiﬁcant effects on takeover outcomes, the G
Index “is not signiﬁcant in predicting a ﬁrm’s risk of being acquired”).
297. See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Debate on Contractual Freedom in
Corporate Law, 89 Colum. L. Rev. 1395, 1401 n.32 (1989) (advocating a mandatory rule
limiting midstream amendments of corporate charters, as such amendments often transfer
value from shareholders to managers); Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Limiting Contractual Freedom
in Corporate Law: The Desirable Constraints on Charter Amendments, 102 Harv. L. Rev.
1820, 1836 (1989) (arguing that mandatory rules should preclude midstream amendments
of corporate charters because shareholders lack information to make voting decisions).
298. See Bebchuk et al., Stock Pyramids, supra note 7, at 295 (claiming that dual-class
shares produce a radical separation between control rights and cash-ﬂow rights).
299. See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk & Robert J. Jackson, Jr., Toward a Constitutional
Review of the Poison Pill, 114 Colum. L. Rev. 1549, 1551 (2014) (arguing that the Williams
Act may preempt state laws that authorize the use of the poison pill).
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boards300 while requiring majority voting301 and proxy access.302 But the
inescapable tradeoff between principal costs and agent costs cautions
against such one-size-ﬁts-all regulations.303 It suggests that lawmakers
should permit a range of governance structures, enabling each ﬁrm to
allocate control rights in the manner that minimizes total control costs.
As an illustration, consider the debate over proxy access. Because
proxy access reduces agent costs, many scholars would mandate it.304
Their advocacy found success in 2010 when the SEC announced Rule
14a-11, which would have required proxy access at all public compa-
nies.305 But before the rule could go into effect, the D.C. Circuit Court of
Appeals vacated it on grounds that the SEC had failed to conduct an
adequate cost-beneﬁt analysis.306 Shifting tactics, advocates pressed ﬁrms
to adopt proxy access voluntarily.307 Buttressing these efforts, the Delaware
legislature amended the state’s general corporations law to permit proxy-
access bylaws308 and the SEC amended Rule 14a-8 (the town-meeting rule)
300. See, e.g., Bebchuk et al., Force of Staggered Boards, supra note 6, at 936–39
(arguing that the powerful antitakeover effect of staggered boards harms target
shareholders).
301. See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Myth of the Shareholder Franchise, 93 Va. L.
Rev. 675, 702 (2007) (arguing that majority voting should be the default rule due to the
“clear and widely accepted ﬂaws” of plurality voting).
302. See, e.g., Bebchuk, Shareholder Access, supra note 284, at 66 (concluding that a
well-designed shareholder-access regime would contribute to making directors more
accountable and would improve corporate governance).
303. See, e.g., Sridhar Arcot & Valentina Bruno, One Size Does Not Fit All, After All:
Evidence from Corporate Governance 1 (Jan. 15, 2007) (unpublished manuscript),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=887947 (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review) (ﬁnding that
“companies that depart from governance best practice because of genuine circumstances
outperform all others and cannot be considered badly-governed,” and arguing that
“ﬂexibility in corporate governance regulation plays a crucial role, because companies are
not homogenous entities”).
304. See, e.g., Bebchuk & Hirst, supra note 5, at 350 (concluding that some ﬁrms
whose shareholders favor proxy access will fail to adopt it unless proxy access is made the
default rule).
305. See Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, 75 Fed. Reg. 56,668, 56,668
(Sept. 16, 2010) (codiﬁed at 17 C.F.R. pts. 200, 232, 240 and 249) (announcing changes to
the federal proxy-access rules).
306. Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144, 1148–49 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (“[T]he
Commission inconsistently and opportunistically framed the costs and beneﬁts of the rule;
failed adequately to quantify the certain costs or to explain why those costs could not be
quantiﬁed; neglected to support its predictive judgments; contradicted itself; and failed to
respond to substantial problems raised by commenters.”).
307. See, e.g., Adam Brown, New York City Comptroller Expands Proxy Access
Campaign, IR Mag. (Jan. 12, 2016), http://www.irmagazine.com/articles/corporate-
governance/21183/new-york-city-comptroller-expands-proxy-access-campaign/ (on file with
the Columbia Law Review) (explaining the New York City pension fund system ﬁled seventy-
two shareholder resolutions demanding proxy access).
308. Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 112 (2016).
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to allow proxy-access proposals.309 Consequently, in 2015 over half of all
proxy-access proposals submitted under Rule 14a-8 passed,310 and compa-
nies such as General Electric adopted proxy access unilaterally, without a
shareholder proposal.311
Despite such successes, shareholders are not always receptive to
proxy access, and most large companies have not adopted it.312 Scholars
who focus primarily on agency costs blame this continuing resistance on
market failure and destructive conﬂicts of interest among institutional
investors.313 They thus continue to favor mandatory proxy access for all
public ﬁrms.314
Principal-cost theory counsels against mandatory proxy access.
Because its impact on control costs depends on ﬁrm-speciﬁc characteris-
tics,315 proxy access is likely to beneﬁt some ﬁrms but harm others. There-
fore, lawmakers should respect the shareholders’ decision at each ﬁrm as
to whether to adopt the measure. Indeed, the failure of approximately
half of the shareholder proxy-access proposals during the 2015 proxy
season suggests that, in many ﬁrms, shareholders believe that proxy
access would increase principal costs more than it would decrease agent
costs.316 At the same time, the adoption of proxy access by numerous
public corporations suggests that there are no persistent market failures
or conﬂicts of interest that prevent investors from choosing the right
governance features for their firms.317 The lack of substantial market impe-
diments to shareholder-initiated change318 is also suggested by share-
309. 75 Fed. Reg. at 56,730.
310. Holly J. Gregory, Sidley Austin LLP, Hot Topics for the 2016 Proxy Season 33
(2015), http://www.sidley.com/~/media/publications/oct15_governancecounselor.pdf
[http://perma.cc/HY6U-8KL3] (reporting that proxy-access proposals had received, on
average, the support of 54.3% of voting shares and had passed at 51 out of 87 companies).
311. Ted Mann & Joann S. Lublin, GE to Allow Proxy Access for Big Investors, Wall St. J.
(Feb. 11, 2015, 6:40 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/ge-amends-bylaws-to-allow-proxy-
access-for-big-investors-1423698010 (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review).
312. See Joann S. Lublin, Investors Gain Greater Clout over Boards, Wall St. J. (Jan.
10, 2016, 7:00 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/investors-gain-greater-clout-over-boards-
1452470402 (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (noting that Institutional Shareholder
Services Inc. reported that only 21% of S&P 500 companies adopted proxy access in 2015).
313. See, e.g., Bebchuk & Hirst, supra note 5, at 332.
314. See id.
315. See supra section IV.A.6 (discussing how proxy access reallocates control rights
from boards to shareholders and as such will decrease agent costs and increase principal
costs, with the overall effect being ﬁrm-speciﬁc).
316. See supra note 310 and accompanying text.
317. See Lublin, supra note 312 (reporting that “American businesses are increasingly
bowing to investors’ demands for greater boardroom clout, with dozens of companies
revising their bylaws” ahead of 2015 annual meetings).
318. See Bebchuk, Shareholder Access, supra note 284, at 45 (describing the “public
good” problem with running proxy contests).
828 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 117:767
holder-rights advocates’ successful campaigns to destagger boards319 and
establish majority voting.320 Even if collective-action problems were once
formidable enough to militate for default rules that empower share-
holders, the concern seems no longer justiﬁed given the prevalence of
institutional ownership and shareholder activism today.321
In short, lawmakers should not mandate changes in the allocation of
control rights between investors and managers. Instead they should
adopt measures that enable parties to craft ﬁrm-speciﬁc solutions to the
many nuances of the perennial principal–agent problem.322 In particular,
lawmakers should transform rules that dictate the allocation of control
rights into default rules323 unless there is a speciﬁc market failure.324
Additionally, when choosing default settings for new ﬁrms, lawmakers
should not simply pick the setting that empowers shareholders; rather,
they should adopt a majoritarian default, setting the rule that would
minimize total control costs at the majority of ﬁrms.325 For ﬁrms that have
already crafted their governance structures, lawmakers should respect the
status quo. Certainly, they should never impose a new mandatory rule: As
illustrated by Massachusetts’s experience with compulsory staggered
boards, most ﬁrms have already adjusted their governance structures,
capital structures, and business strategies to minimize the sum of princi-
pal costs and agent costs within the existing legal environment.326
319. See supra note 251 and accompanying text (discussing how Professor Bebchuk
and Harvard Law School’s Shareholder Rights Project persuaded the boards of approxi-
mately one-third of all S&P 500 companies to destagger).
320. See Choi et al., supra note 278, at 1124–29.
321. See Gilson & Gordon, supra note 60, at 866–67 (arguing that institutional inves-
tors will respond to proposals initiated by activist shareholders).
322. The claim that corporate law should consist of default rules is a central tenet of
the contractarian school. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The
Economic Structure of Corporate Law 6–7 (1996) [hereinafter Easterbrook & Fischel, The
Economic Structure]; cf. Hansmann & Kraakman, End of History, supra note 143, at 439–
41 (observing that corporate-governance structures throughout the world have converged
around a “standard shareholder-oriented model”).
323. See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Preserving Director Primacy by Managing
Shareholder Interventions, in Research Handbook on Shareholder Power and Activism
231, 246 (Jennifer G. Hill & Randall S. Thomas eds., 2015) (arguing that corporations
should be permitted to opt out of the SEC’s mandatory shareholder proposal rule).
324. Cf. Gabriel Rauterberg & Eric Talley, Contracting Out of the Fiduciary Duty of
Loyalty: An Empirical Analysis of Corporate Opportunity Waivers, 117 Colum. L. Rev.
(forthcoming 2017) (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review) (analyzing the effects of the
newly provided option to opt out of the duty of loyalty as it pertains to corporate oppor-
tunities); Roberta Romano, Answering the Wrong Question: The Tenuous Case for
Mandatory Corporate Laws, 89 Colum. L. Rev. 1599, 1616–17 (1989) (seeking to limit the
role of mandatory corporate law to cases in which externalities are present).
325. See, e.g., Easterbrook & Fischel, The Economic Structure, supra note 322, at 28.
326. See supra notes 264–265 and accompanying text.
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CONCLUSION
This Essay has introduced the principal-cost theory of corporate law
and governance. The theory states that a business ﬁrm’s optimal gover-
nance structure minimizes the sum of principal costs and agent costs.
Principal costs arise when investors exercise control in a manner that,
due to honest mistakes or self-seeking motives, reduces a ﬁrm’s value.
Agent costs arise when managers do the same. There is an unavoidable
tradeoff between principal costs and agent costs: Any reallocation of con-
trol rights in a firm necessarily decreases one type of cost but increases the
other. The division of control that minimizes the sum of principal costs
and agent costs is ﬁrm-speciﬁc, based on factors such as industry, business
strategy, and the personal characteristics of the investors and managers.
Principal-cost theory explains features of business ﬁrms that agency-
cost essentialism, the prevailing paradigm in the study of corporate law,
cannot. The essentialist view is that, at any given level of production, a
ﬁrm’s optimal governance structure minimizes agent conﬂict costs: the
direct and indirect costs of self-seeking conduct by managers. That theory
has difficulty explaining the spectrum of governance structures that ﬁrms
adopt, ranging from structures that give managers autonomy (such as the
dual-class share structure) to those that empower shareholders to hold
managers accountable (such as the dispersed-ownership structure without
a staggered board). Agency-cost essentialism holds that ﬁrms that give
less power to shareholders will consistently generate lower ﬁnancial
returns than those that empower shareholders. Yet careful empirical stu-
dies refute this claim. Principal-cost theory, by contrast, explains that the
governance-structure spectrum reﬂects the ﬁrm-speciﬁc nature of the
principal-cost/agent-cost tradeoff, and it accurately predicts that ﬁrms
will be found to generate consistent ﬁnancial returns across the spectrum
once ﬁrm-speciﬁc characteristics are taken into account.
Principal-cost theory also offers different policy prescriptions.
Because agency-cost essentialism holds that corporate governance fea-
tures that disempower shareholders, such as staggered boards and dual-
class shares, destroy ﬁrm value, many of its adherents argue that such
features should be banned. Principal-cost theory, by contrast, suggests
that lawmakers should avoid one-size-ﬁts-all governance rules and instead
allow each ﬁrm to tailor its governance structure in the manner that
strikes the firm-specific optimal balance between principal costs and agent
costs. Because principal-cost theory reframes many of the key debates in
corporate governance, the full extent of its predictive and prescriptive
implications is a promising subject for future scholarship.
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